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GIVING EVIL ITS DUE: RADICAL EVIL AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 
JOHNATHAN IRVING KELLY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Despite Hannah Arendt's prediction in the wake of World War II that "the 
problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life," the 
majority of postwar philosophers have preferred to stay away from the idea of evil.  But 
at the same time that philosophical reflection on the notion of evil has dissipated, there is 
no denying the fact that referring to "evil" has remained very common among the public 
at large, among political leaders, and in popular culture.  To better understand what 
meaning the concept of evil might have for us today, in this paper I will address two main 
questions.  First, recognizing the problems recent philosophers have raised against the 
idea of "evil," we should ask if we should simply take our leave of the concept of evil, 
admitting that it has been exhausted by overuse, shifting intellectual paradigms, and a 
triumphant secular age.  In other words, does it make any sense for us today to go beyond 
calling something wrong or unjust or harmful or unspeakable and to speak in terms of 
"evil?"  Is talk about evil simply a relic of a way of speaking and thinking about the 
world that we have long left behind? Is "evil" in fact one of those terms that have always 
drawn people into error and sometimes even into committing horrific acts? 
 Second, if we believe we can begin to address this first set of questions about the 
notion of evil, it remains to be seen what exactly we might mean by evil. What are we 
 viii 
pointing to when we call something "evil?" What makes something evil rather than 
merely wrong or unjust? What kinds of things do we reserve the judgment of evil for? 
This set of questions leads us to come up with a substantive account of evil, an account of 
what evil is and what distinguishes evil from other wrongdoing. 
To address these questions, our argument will proceed as follows.  We will begin 
with an overview of the recent return to discussing evil after a turn away from evil by the 
majority working in philosophy.  After giving a brief historical overview of these shifts 
we will then begin to argue for the need for philosophers to think about evil and the 
concept of evil.  In short, as I will argue, because we continue to turn to the notion of evil 
in response to extreme forms of wrongdoing, philosophical reflection is warranted in 
trying to clarify what we might reasonably mean when we call an agent or action evil. 
Moving to a discussion of the idea of radical evil, we will begin with a close 
reading and interpretation of Kant's account of radical evil, pausing to discuss what he 
gets right and where he may err.  We will then move to recent discussions of evil in 
contemporary philosophy, much of which can be understood as revolving around Kant's 
account of radical evil.  In these contemporary accounts, evil is no longer used in an 
inclusive, wide sense, but almost exclusively to refer to the kinds of extreme, 
unforgivable wrongdoing we might classify under the notion of radical evil. In these 
recent accounts, there is an attempt to distinguish degrees of evil, between the "normal" 
or "ordinary" evils of serious wrongdoing that we nevertheless can understand, punish, 
and cope with, versus the "radical" or extreme evils that we cannot really understand, 
punish, or fit into our intellectual and moral frameworks.   
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After discussing these recent accounts and appreciating the progress they make, 
we will nevertheless ask whether they can really help us grasp the kinds of horrendous 
evil they were developed in response to.  In particular, we will argue that these recent 
accounts still fail to appreciate the notion of radical evil to its full extent, preferring to 
focus on the harm caused and on notions like the banality of evil and ordinary evildoers, 
projects which may end up distorting the nature of evil.  Looking to some recent 
reflections on radical evil, we will argue that the Kantian notion of a perversion of the 
will and an evil heart help us to understand that radical evil is something that is usually 
anything but banal, but is a fundamental breach of our normal standards of wrongness 
and that this quality of excess and the inversion of the moral is what lies at the core of the 
acts and agents we deem evil.  We will conclude by looking at the necessary limits of any 
abstract discussion of evil in general and how particular evils such as those experienced 
at Auschwitz cannot even begin to be explained by such accounts, arguing that our 
discomfort and horror in the face of evil nevertheless remains but that such attempts at 
reflection and understanding evil remain necessary and urgent. 
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INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS WITH EVIL 
 
Writing with a sense of urgency few philosophers have matched, Emmanuel Levinas 
opens his great work Totality and Infinity by famously declaring: "Everyone will readily 
agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by 
morality."1  Why would Levinas choose to begin his far-reaching magnum opus with this 
provocation? What does it mean to wonder if we are duped by morality, and why is the 
question so urgent and personal for Levinas as he begins the book which will stand as the 
supreme expression of his thought?  After opening the book with this jarring question, 
Levinas provides a clue to the historical events which have made this question a constant 
preoccupation for him personally in the next few paragraphs of Totality and Infinity, 
where he writes of the destruction that war has brought on humanity and the toll it has 
taken on our belief that morality is more than something simply illusory and disposable.  
In a later interview, Levinas makes clear that it is the recent horrors in Nazi-occupied 
Europe that have made questions about the status of morality unavoidable: "The essential 
problem is: can we speak of an absolute commandment after Auschwitz?  Can we speak 
of morality after the failure of morality?"2  Unlike most other major figures in 20th 
century philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic, the absolute failure of morality and of 
all standards of human dignity which reigned under the Nazi regime animates much of 
                                                
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), p. 21 
2 See The Provocation of Levinas, Edited by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York and 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988), p. 176 
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Levinas's work and leads him to explore the questions of the mysteries of good and evil 
and to argue for his distinctive views about the primacy of ethics. 
 In this paper, I want to address a question very much in the same spirit of the 
worry that preoccupies Levinas.  Like many people today, I am somewhat uneasy about 
simple judgments of "good" and "evil," especially those made by public figures.  The 
overuse and exploitation of the idea of evil by politicians, religious fundamentalists, and 
in popular culture makes one rightfully weary about the use of the term "evil."  
Meanwhile, in recent philosophy, moral and political philosophers have had a hard time 
in the 20th century with coming to much in the way of a shared understanding of what 
makes an action, agent, or institution virtuous, just, good, or morally praiseworthy -- so 
coming to any shared understanding of what evil may mean seems like an even bigger 
long shot.  And yet, on the question of evil (and immorality more generally), there does 
seem to be a consensus of sorts in academic philosophy -- a silent consensus, a consensus 
to not talk about evil and instead to stick to other topics in moral theory and practical 
ethics.  This silence, along with a more general skepticism of the notion of "evil," makes 
us pause to wonder whether anyone who employs the term "evil" today is not simply 
duped or mistaken.   
 Echoing Levinas, we might say that despite the ease with which many people 
continue to speak of "evils" and "evil" actions and agents, it remains of utmost 
importance whether we are saying anything meaningful when we employ the concept of 
evil.  In this paper, we will take up Levinas's troubling question and bring it to bear on 
two sets of related questions.  First, we must ask if we should simply take our leave of the 
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concept of evil, admitting that its use has been exhausted by overuse, shifting intellectual 
paradigms, and a triumphant secular age. What possible meaning can the concept of evil 
retain for us today, besides as something we might explore as an important subject for 
historians of philosophy or religion?  Does it make any sense for us today to go beyond 
calling something wrong or unjust or harmful or unspeakable and to speak in terms of 
"evil?" What use can this concept have for us in the 21st century?  Is it simply a relic of a 
way of speaking and thinking about the world that we have long left behind? Is it even 
one of those terms that have always drawn people into error or sometimes even into 
committing horrific acts? 
 Second, if we believe we can begin to address this first set of questions about the 
notion of evil, it remains to be seen what exactly we might mean by evil. What are we 
pointing to when we call something evil? What makes something evil rather than merely 
wrong or unjust? What kinds of things do we reserve the judgment of evil for? This set of 
questions leads us to come up with a substantive account of evil, an account of what evil 
is and what distinguishes evil from other wrongs. 
While these two sets of issues raise a host of difficult questions, too many to even 
scratch the surface of here, we will nevertheless try to work towards an account of evil in 
this paper that shows that the concept of evil is an important moral concept that we 
should preserve in our moral judgments for dealing with the undeniable instances of 
evildoing that continue to confront us.  With this groundwork laid, we can then move on 
to compare conceptions of evil and argue that the most viable account of evil for us today 
is a version of the notion of radical evil, an account first developed by Kant and that 
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retains much value today in making sense of the kinds of extreme, unjustifiable and 
unforgivable instances of wrongdoing we rightly describe as evil. 
Before moving to discuss this account of radical evil, we must first address the 
many obstacles standing in the way of developing a viable conception of evil that will be 
useful to us in our moral judgments and reflections.  Beginning with the lingering doubts 
about the notion of evil and its abuse mentioned above, we can admit that there is of 
course much to point to in questioning whether we might be duped by talk about evil.  
There is no doubt that much discourse about evil, especially in recent politics and during 
the upheavals of the 20th century, has been deployed either to dupe the public or to 
justify the violence and policies of certain groups or regimes against the innocent.  For 
good reason, we are therefore skeptical when we hear political leaders speak about the 
evil of another nation and its leaders.  But being critical and skeptical in thinking about 
the use and abuse of the concept of evil should lead us to think more deeply about evil 
and what it might mean for us today, rather than simply dismissing reflection on an idea 
that many will continue to use in everyday conversation and in political and religiously 
charged rhetoric.   
Richard Bernstein, one of the key figures in recent philosophy to return attention 
to the idea of evil, has raised the alarm about what he calls "the abuse of evil."  
Bernstein's work on evil preceded the September 11 terrorist attacks, but he sees that talk 
about evil suddenly became a big part of Americans' public discourse following 9/11.  As 
Bernstein reflects on this change,  
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"But something happened on 9/11. Overnight (literally) our politicians and media 
were broadcasting about evil. We were flooded with headlines about evil and 
images displaying evil—from the repetitive TV images of the crumbling of the 
World Trade Center Towers to the smirking faces of Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein. Suddenly the world was divided into a simple (and simplistic) 
duality—the evil ones seeking to destroy us and those committed to the war 
against evil. What is so disturbing about the post-9/11 evil talk is its immense 
popular appeal. Few stop to ask: What do we really mean by evil? What are we 
saying when we label our enemies evil? And who are these enemies? It is 
presumably self-evident. In a world in which there is both genuine and 
manipulated fear about the threats of terrorism that can strike at any place and 
any time, it is psychologically reassuring to label our enemies 'evil.'”3 
 Bernstein and others are right to be worried about the uses the idea of evil can be 
put to, in particular in the long-practiced tradition of labeling some enemy "evil" in order 
to justify the hatred or harm perpetrated against them.  And yet despite the discomfort 
recent philosophers and others may have with using the term evil, there seems to be no 
letting up in the way people continue to speak about evil in everyday conversation and 
moral judgment.  As Manfred Kuehn notes in a perceptive article on the concept of evil, 
"There is a sense in which the existence of something like 'evil' cannot be doubted. Apart 
from its verging on a daily topic of conversation, the discussion of evil pervades our 
                                                
3 Richard Bernstein, "The Abuse of Evil," in Deliver Us From Evil, Edited by M. David Eckel 
and Bradley L. Herling (Continuum: New York, 2008), p. 102 
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theological, philosophical, literary, and political traditions. We have no problem referring 
to the 'evils of humanity' or describing someone as 'evil'; we know 'evil acts,' 'villainy,' 
and 'maliciousness'....I know of no language—and I think there is no such language—in 
which one is unable to distinguish between 'good' and 'evil' or in which this distinction 
does not play a foundational role. Common sense and ordinary language attest to the 
phenomenon of evil."4  Like it or not, Kuehn points out, the concept of evil seems to be 
here to stay, and we can either refuse to recognize its enduring place in our understanding 
of the world or we can ask ourselves why the concept continues to be used and ask what 
it might mean.  The resilience of the concept of evil reminds us that no matter how much 
we may be wary of speaking about evil, the phenomena we have difficulty describing 
other than in terms of evil continues to outpace our intellectual discomfort with the 
notion. 
This reticence about speaking in terms of evil rather than it terms of wrongdoing 
or injustice and human rights may account at least in part for the absence of discussion of 
evil in much of 20th century philosophy.  But one wonders whether there is more to it 
then this general move away from moral and religious absolutes. As Berel Lang suggests 
in one of his essays exploring the almost total absence of discussion of the Holocaust in 
philosophy, recent Anglo-American philosophy has taken a decidedly non-historical or 
even anti-historical turn as it has tried to find its footing as a distinctive discipline.5  
                                                
4 Manfred Kuehn, "How Banal is Evil?," in Deliver Us From Evil, p. 133 
5 See the essays by Lang collected in his book Post-Holocaust: Interpretation, Misinterpretation, 
and the Claims of History (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, Indiana, 2005), and in 
particular the concluding chapter, "Philosophy and/of the Holocaust." 
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Under pressure from within and outside philosophy, academic philosophy has recently 
been resistant to getting too intertwined with history, current politics, and other realms 
that were seen earlier as relevant for philosophy and which were subject to philosophical 
criticism and exploration throughout the history of philosophy.  As Lang points out, this 
apparent shift in relation to history does not serve philosophy or historical understanding 
very well, as Kant well understood in his famous warning about severing the relationship 
between theory/philosophy and history/concrete reality: "Concepts without percepts are 
empty, percepts without concepts are blind."  This is a very familiar complaint against the 
current state of academic philosophy, but it bears repeating given the near absence of 
reflection on evil in an ever-exploding and wide-ranging academic literature on all kinds 
of problems, sub-problems, and hyper-specialized debates in moral philosophy. 
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HOW RADICAL IS EVIL? 
While the subordination of the notion of evil to other topics in ethics -- and the very 
much alive assumption that evil is merely privation or absence -- continues to be 
influential, the horrific events of the 20th century have caused many to rethink whether 
evil is indeed merely a lack of goodness rather than something radical, active, and 
enormously disruptive and powerful.  In the article "Transcendence and Evil," Levinas 
speaks of evil as inherently an excess, an essential break with the normative, something 
active and transgressive.  As Richard Bernstein writes of Levinas's account, "Evil as 
excess initially suggests the excess of its quantitative intensity, ‘of a degree surpassing 
measure.'"6  In another formulation of this idea, Levinas stresses that "evil is an excess in 
its very quiddity."7 Evil is not an excess simply because suffering can be terrible and 
unendurable.  Rather, evil's "break with the normal and the normative, with order, with 
synthesis, with the world, already constitutes its qualitative essence."8  The etymology of 
the English word "evil" supports this notion of evil as excess and something active, even 
radical.  The word "evil" is derived from the Old English "ofel," which fundamentally 
means "over" or "above," "exceeding due measure" or "overstepping private limits."9  As 
the etymology of "evil" demonstrates, for English-speakers evil has long been understood 
                                                
6 Bernstein, "Evil and Theodicy," in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Edited by Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004), p. 260  
7 Levinas, "Transcendence and Evil," in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 158 
8 Ibid. 
9 Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online. June 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/65386?rskey=gR6VvS&result=3 (accessed June 11, 2014). 
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not as a void, nothingness, or an absence, but from the beginning has been understood as 
some sort of excess, as something over and above the norm or normal.   
Like Levinas, James Dawes points to the paradoxical yet necessary place we 
reserve for the term evil to speak about those wrongs which exceed or go beyond our 
normal categories of wrong in an article summarizing his recent book Evil Men.  The 
radical or "going beyond" quality that Dawes points to is similar to the excess of evil that 
Levinas describes and will also be among the key features I single out as what 
distinguishes radical evil.  Dawes begins by conceding the many difficulties with 
employing the term "evil," difficulties that in the end are only outweighed by the horrors 
that we can find no other word when confronting them: "'Evil' can be a sloppy word, an 
impediment to understanding. It means 'bad' plus unidentified metaphysical stuff.' Saying 
something is evil is often a way of ending a conversation, stopping further analysis, 
letting ourselves be satisfied with thought-dulling mystery. 'Evil' can also be a dangerous 
word. To say something is evil is to say it can't be understood; it can only be hated. We 
use the word 'evil' when we need to prepare ourselves to do violence. Evil is the ultimate 
'other.' But to talk about these [mass killers], I need a word that insists there are acts that 
exceed our normal categories of wrong. I need a word that insists that, no matter how 
long you stare at it, no matter what light you put it in, there will always remain something 
beyond what you are able to see or say. These were evil men."10 
Paul Ricoeur also draws attention to evil as an excess, a defining quality so 
powerful that it gives rise to the absolute no or prohibitive character of morality, which 
                                                
10  James Dawes, "Understanding Evil," The Chronicle of Higher Education," July 1, 2013. 
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receives this distinctive prohibitive character largely by opposing evil with the "thou shalt 
not."  As Ricoeur writes,  "This sinister — though not exhaustive — enumeration of the 
figures of evil in the intersubjective dimension established by solicitude has its 
counterpart in the series of prescriptions and prohibitions stemming from the Golden 
Rule....you shall not lie, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, you shall not torture. In 
each case, morality replies to violence. And if the commandment cannot do otherwise 
than to take the form of a prohibition, this is precisely because of evil: to all the figures of 
evil responds the no of morality. Here, doubtless, resides the ultimate reason for which 
the negative form of prohibition is inexpungible."11 In other words, as Kuehn and Ricoeur 
both stress, the unequivocal “no" to evil which is spoken by moral judgment is a 
necessary, powerful response to evil's transgression of the ethical.  As Ricoeur argues, 
moral judgment's negative/prohibitive form is the basic human response to evil; "thou 
shalt not commit evil" is at the essence of all major moral traditions, where prohibitions 
against evil form a central, irreplaceable role. 
In other texts discussing the phenomenology of evil, or the experiences of evil as 
suffering and fault, Ricoeur provides an important discussion of the several stages and 
transformations that the problem of evil has gone through, from the early phases of myth 
and spiritual texts to theodicy and philosophy.12 Ricoeur draws attention to the ways evil 
                                                
11 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, Translated by Kathleen Blarney (University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago, 1992), p. 221 
12 See, in particular, Ricoeur's early book, The Symbolism of Evil (Beacon Press: Boston, 1967), 
and one of his late essays, "Evil: A Problem for Philosophy and Theology," Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion, Vol. 53, No. 4, p. 635-648.  Ricoeur also discusses radical evil 
in his important late work Oneself as Another. 
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has been represented in various forms of discourse and narrative, early on as impurity and 
stain, then as sin and then guilt; and more generally as a cosmic force along with good, 
and as enduring problems for theology and philosophy, for theory and practice.   Evil has 
also always had a two-fold character, as "evil done" (sin, guilt, fault) and "evil suffered" 
(stain) -- in other words, evil is always experienced on two sides, the experience of the 
evildoer and the experience of the one who suffers.  Of course, reflections on evil often 
focus almost exclusively on one or the other of these two sides, on the actions of the 
perpetrators or the suffering of the victims.  But as Ricoeur, Levinas, and others have 
tried to make clear, evil has a fundamental relational or interpersonal nature, which 
makes a more integrated account of evil connecting suffering and wrongdoing all the 
more necessary.13   
Ricoeur also pays special attention to the pre-theoretical expressions of evil found 
largely in early myths and religious texts.14  Ricoeur marks a key shift in thinking about 
evil when philosophy and theology take up the challenge of confronting evil (and 
approach it via the prior representations of evil in myths and other symbols of the 
experience of evil). Although what has come to be known as "the problem of evil" has 
long had a moral/practical dimension -- regarding blame, human responsibility, the will, 
human nature, etc., -- it nevertheless began as mainly a theoretical (largely theological) 
                                                
13 In his two-volume history of the Holocaust, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Saul Friedlander also 
attempts to develop what he calls an "integrated history" of the Nazi crimes against the Jews, 
shaping his narrative through a close look at the Nazi documents, the diaries and memoirs of the 
victims, and previous studies of the period.  By interweaving these elements into his far-reaching 
historical narrative, Friedlander brings together the wrongs and intentions of the perpetrators with 
the suffering and responses of the victims and survivors. 
14 See Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. 
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problem, raising questions about God's existence and justice and the question of the 
origins of evil.  Ricoeur discusses in detail how evil and suffering are conceived in 
largely cosmological/theological terms in several key early cosmological myths, the 
Greek myths, the book of Genesis and the story of the Fall, the theology of Augustine and 
the theodicy of Leibniz.  Ricoeur draws attention to a key shift first towards the ethical in 
the discourse about evil first emerging with Kant, who rejects the project of theodicy and 
sees evil mainly as a practical or moral problem. Evil then becomes an issue of 
explaining the nature of human evildoing and how evil is possible in the human will and 
as the result of free choice.  Evil, for the heirs of Kant's philosophy, is therefore mainly a 
practical/moral problem, more a problem related to moral judgment and practice than 
theodicy, the origins of the universe, or other far-reaching metaphysical problems. 
And yet, as Ricoeur's explorations of the various forms of discourse of evil 
testifies to, human responses to evil still retain a quasi-religious status, a way of thinking 
and speaking that is perhaps more at home in religion, where acknowledging the 
fundamental experiences of doing evil (sin) and suffering evil are a constant subject in 
religion, and the inexplicable, irrational qualities of extreme evildoing are given voice by 
those crying out for help or justice from God or who protest God's allowing evil to go 
unpunished. In this light we might see the idea of evil as a notion that is both 
philosophical/ethical and deeply religious, something we know to be human and 
pervasive and yet retaining qualities that are not fully at home in our secular moral 
frameworks and which forces us to look beyond familiar categories.  As Ricoeur 
memorably put it in his book on the stages in the discourse on evil, "the image gives rise 
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to thought" -- the experience of evil captured in myths and religious texts lies at the 
bottom of our conception of evil, and thus however much we may think our moral or 
abstract conceptions of evil depart from the mythical or religious they can never quite 
escape from these powerful beginnings. 
 In this spirit, Maeve Cooke also suggests how radical evil may force us to move 
beyond our usual ways of thinking into something closer to a religious, post-secular 
mode:  
"But what can explain the horror aroused by radical evil, if we do not want to 
link that horror with the transcendent nature of that which is violated by radical 
evil? If we accept Plato’s and Kant’s idea that no human being acts in a 
deliberately immoral way, following a principle aimed at destroying the moral 
point of view, then the horror aroused by radical evil comes from among other 
things the realization of the extreme extent to which our representations and 
moral judgments may, when wrong, lead us to lose touch with reality. Moral 
communities always discover afterwards—ex post facto— that what was done by 
their members in pursuit of shared views of the good was radically evil. The 
horror we experience when thinking of the Holocaust or of other episodes of 
radical evil is linked with the horror that the abyss of psychosis arouses—the 
horror at the idea of total loss of touch with the reality as seen by other human 
beings, or total encapsulation into a world no one understands, of total 
unrelatedness between the meaning we assign to our actions and the meaning 
they acquire in the world of all other human beings. When we look at radical evil 
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from the perspective of the victims, the horror is aroused by the abyss that 
separates their innocence from their fate, again, the meaninglessness for them of 
the destruction they suffered or the total unrelatedness of their deeds and their 
fate. That is why Habermas speaks of a 'reflection on the incomprehensible” in 
relation to Auschwitz.'"15 
In each of their distinctive accounts, Ricoeur, Dawes, Cooke, and Levinas each 
point to the apparent explanation-defying qualities of evil.  While this may make evil into 
something like "wrongness" plus something metaphysical or inexplicable, as Dawes 
suggests, Kuehn addresses this issue from a different perspective and argues that evil is 
not something we need to understand (or should want to understand) in going about 
making moral judgments about evildoing:  
"[Those who judge something to be evil] may not have any idea about what evil 
'really is' psychologically speaking, and they may, in fact, doubt that an act that is 
judged to be 'evil' can really be understood as evil by looking at the motives of 
the perpetrator. But this does not matter.  To say it again: trying to understand 
evil is different from passing moral judgments or deciding whether particular 
actions or practices are evil....The principle of evaluating an action and the reason 
for which someone committed an act need not mirror each other. I can say that an 
act is evil without knowing anything about why a perpetrator committed it, and I 
want to suggest that, whenever we judge an act to be really evil, we should not 
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Contemporary Perspectives, Edited by Maria Pia Lara (University of California Press: Berkeley 
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really care to understand it.  Perhaps we can say that whenever it is necessary to 
judge the actions of normal criminals, we should attempt to understand them. 
However, from this it does not follow that we should not judge horrific crimes to 
be bad or evil, if we are incapable of understanding these acts."16  
 
Kuehn draws attention to this distinct understanding of evil as a moral and 
practical problem rather than a psychological or explanatory concept employed in order 
to give an account of why some horrific wrongdoing was committed:  
"When I look for the psychological causes of an action or a particular mode of 
conduct or practice, I am of course taking the standpoint from which [as Kant 
writes] 'we contemplate ourselves with reference to our actions as effects we see 
before our eyes,' that is, from the theoretical standpoint of causality or from 
natural or social science. I am attempting to explain why someone has taken this 
or that particular course of action. And it is completely legitimate and important 
to understand how and why we or others decide to take a particular action. 
However, and this seems important to me, when we ask such questions we are 
moving into the descriptive realm of psychology and not in the normative region 
of morals. Moral judgments introduce considerations that differ from 
psychological descriptions or theories. Admittedly, I do not want to go so far as 
Kant, who thought that all psychological considerations were irrelevant for 
morality. But I am worried about whether the importance of understanding is not 
                                                
16 Kuehn, "How Banal is Evil?," p. 145 
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often exaggerated today. Once one reduces fundamental moral categories to 
things purely psychological, like 'thoughtlessness,' one has to wonder indeed 
whether evil has not become an everyday occurrence. Understanding evil and 
judging evil do not seem to me as closely connected as many thoughtful people 
think."17    
As Susan Neiman helpfully notes, the problem of evil is in this sense not just a 
philosophical problem of constructing definitions and testing out accounts to see which 
has the most explanatory power -- anyone writing about evil faces a pressing moral 
problem as well.  Neiman singles out the work of the Holocaust survivor Jean Amery as a 
powerful messenger of this point of view:  
"There are, very broadly, two sorts of positions which can be taken toward the 
problem of evil, and that both have been taken toward Auschwitz as toward 
Lisbon. Each stems from moral, not metaphysical, grounds. One holds it indecent 
to attempt to explain the existence of evil. For, protests to the contrary, to explain 
something is to justify it—at least to a point....The idea that Auschwitz was so 
absolutely evil that it should defy our capacities for comprehension has been 
maintained by a number of contemporary thinkers, but none better than Jean 
Améry. His account of the intellectual at Auschwitz is one of the most deep and 
chilling left by any survivor, and it may lead us to conclude that this is an event 
of which we should not make sense....Améry’s work wrestles with questions of 
meaning which straddle the range from metaphysics to morals. His answers are 
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 143 
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inconclusive, but they raise at least a warning: where events call the value of 
reason itself into question, we should be wary of the urge to comprehension. 
Even Kant found the idea of theodicy to be noxious: solving the problem of evil 
would be a moral mistake."18 
In short, in agreement with the warnings offered by Kuehn, Levinas, and others, I 
do not believe that we can or should even set out to offer a complete resolution to the 
problem of evil or hope for an account that serves as a definitive explanation of evil and 
all evildoing.  As Ricoeur stresses, evil will always pose a challenge to philosophy and 
theology, and to our other ways of making sense of ourselves.  Therefore, no serious 
attempt to grapple with evil will drastically ease the sense of discomfort and perplexity 
that evil confronts us with.  While some may find solace in finding apparent solutions to 
the "Logical Problem of Evil," such efforts arguably end up distorting the nature of evil 
and underserved suffering in order to buy some sort of logical consistency.  With such 
projects in theodicy, the concept of evil is drained of much of the meaning it has held in 
previous discourse, and an inevitable fall into what Levinas calls the "temptation of 
theodicy,"19 the alluring intellectual possibility of explaining evil so successfully that we 
feel no discomfort by the continued existence of evil and horrific suffering in our world.  
Probing the reality of evil in the 20th century is therefore a double edged sword in a 
sense.  A focus on evil can lead one to return to searching for theodicies and ethical 
absolutes, to a premodern ethics and philosophy, to other ways of opposing or 
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19 See Levinas's important essay "Useless Suffering" in Entre Nous (Columbia University Press, 
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rationalizing evil.   But confronting evil can also lead one to radically question all major 
moral and religious viewpoints and to doubt whether there are any moral absolutes -- to 
question what meaning morality can have after the failure of morality, as Levinas puts it. 
This should remind us that whatever the problem of evil really is, it certainly is a 
problem. 
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TOWARDS A CONCEPTION OF RADICAL EVIL 
So what is "the problem of evil?"  In a very helpful overview of discussions of evil in 
modern philosophy, Susan Neiman begins by asserting that the problem of evil involves 
three related questions concerning: 1) the nature of evil 2) why human beings are capable 
of committing horrific, evil acts against each other, and 3) the theological problem of 
evil.20  My discussion in this paper will for the most part be restricted to the first part of 
the problem of evil, to discussing the concept of evil.  As I hope to make clear, trying to 
clarify the concept of evil is a separate endeavor from explaining why human beings do 
evil and how an all-good and all-powerful God might allow evil to exist.  That being said, 
I will from time to time offer a brief discussion on how the conception of evil laid out 
here might bare on how we might begin to answer the questions of why people commit 
evil deeds and how we might approach the theological problem of evil.   
This paper thus aims to make progress towards a contemporary conception of 
radical evil.  I will attempt to defend a conception of radical evil as the most viable 
account of understanding what we mean by evil today.  When we claim that something is 
evil, we are saying that there is a quality of extreme wrongdoing that goes all the way 
down in it, a quality that thoroughly stains and constitutes the character of an agent, act, 
or state of affairs, a state of the worst kind of wrongdoing that really does pick out its 
essential (moral) character.  Radical evil can take many forms, but at its most basic level, 
radical evil involves the subordination of the moral law, the reasonable, humane, and 
decent, the many, to the particular, to the few, the ideologically committed, to the great 
                                                
20 See Neiman, "What's the Problem of Evil?" 
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and powerful -- domination and subordination -- a positive, active form of evil in the will.  
We will look to Kant's account in seeking to understand this essential aspect of evil and 
will then move beyond some of the limitations of his account to move towards a more 
viable contemporary understanding of radical evil. 
The account of radical evil to be filled out in the rest of this paper can be 
summarized as follows: radical evil is a category of wrongdoings that 1) are knowingly 
committed by human agents 2) cause horrific undeserved suffering/harm 3) are 
unjustifiable and unpunishable 4) cannot be judged or explained in terms of ordinary 
moral failings like thoughtlessness, selfishness, envy, conformity, etc. 5) are at their root 
and their core morally horrific and unjustifiable -- this is their distinguishing, overriding 
moral quality.21 
The rest of the paper will be structured to first address questions about the 
usefulness of the concept of evil and then will move to discussing an account of radical 
evil that can serve as the most viable understanding of evil today.  We will begin with an 
overview of the recent return to discussing evil after a turn away from evil among moral 
philosophers (mainly because of the metaphysical/theological undertones of "evil" which 
many are eager to leave behind in favor of concepts like the right, justice and injustice, 
etc., the concept's elusiveness and fundamental difficulties with defining the nature of 
evil, the concept's common usage to judge those actions we cannot really understand 
according to normal human motives and intentions).  After giving voice to these 
                                                
21 Though I depart in some ways from the definitions of evil offered by Kuehn and Card, it will 
become clear that my account owes much to their very helpful discussions of evil and their 
attempts to state fairly precisely the conditions for classifying something as evil. 
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objections, we will then begin to argue for the need for philosophers to think about evil 
and the concept of evil, mainly because the phenomenon of evil is not going away, and 
also because we still speak in terms of evil without much hesitance.  In short, because the 
concept of evil and its use in ordinary language really isn't going anywhere, philosophical 
reflection is warranted in trying to clarify what we reasonably mean when we judge or 
call an agent or action evil. 
Moving to a discussion of the idea of radical evil, we will begin with a close 
reading and interpretation of Kant's account of radical evil, pausing to discuss what he 
gets right (e.g. that evil has to do with an inversion of moral and non-moral, that it points 
to an underlying moral disposition or character and speaks to the maxim or purpose that 
led to an evil action) and where he errs (in particular in his denial of diabolical evil, his 
so-called "morally excluded middle" and his account's absence of discussion of the harms 
evil causes).   
We will then move to recent discussions of evil in contemporary philosophy, 
much of which can be understood as revolving around Kant's account of radical evil.  In 
these contemporary accounts, evil is no longer used in an inclusive, wide sense (as Kant 
and others had), but almost exclusively as referring to the kinds of extreme, unforgivable 
evils we might classify under the notion of radical evil, which Hannah Arendt was 
probably the first to see. On these recent accounts, there is an attempt to distinguish 
degrees of wrongness and of evil, between the "normal" or "ordinary" evils of serious 
wrongdoing that we nevertheless can understand, punish, and cope with, versus the 
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"radical" or extreme evils that we cannot really understand, punish, or fit into our 
intellectual and moral frameworks.   
A close look at the recent literature reveals a growing consensus at least on what 
the concept of evil at the most basic level consists of.  As Claudia Card observes, “the 
secular sense of evil in which it refers to the most heinous wrongs [is] now shared by a 
growing number of philosophers writing about evil.”22  Similarly, Susan Neiman asserts 
in her overview of evil in modern thought, “‘Auschwitz’. . . stands for all we mean when 
we use the word ‘evil’ today: absolute wrongdoing which leaves room for no account and 
no expiation.”23 
After discussing these recent accounts and appreciating the progress they make, 
we will nevertheless ask whether they can really help us grasp the kinds of horrendous 
evil they were developed in response to.  In particular, we will argue that these recent 
accounts still fail to appreciate the notion of radical evil to its full extent, preferring to 
focus on the harm caused rather than the motives of the evildoer, on notions like the 
banality of evil and non-monstrous evildoers, tendencies which may end up distorting the 
nature if evil.  Looking to some recent reflections on radical evil, we will argue that the 
Kantian notion of a perversion of the will and an evil heart help us to understand that 
radical evil is something that is never banal but is a fundamental breach of our normal 
standards of wrongness and that this quality of excess is what lies at the core of the acts 
and agents we deem evil.  We will conclude by looking at the necessary limits of any 
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23 "What's the Problem of Evil?," p. 29 
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abstract discussion of evil in general and how particular evils such as those experienced 
at Auschwitz do not even begin to be explained by such accounts, arguing that our 
discomfort and horror in the face of evil nevertheless remains but that such attempts at 
reflection and understanding evil remain necessary and urgent. 
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THE CONTEMPORARY “WAR ON EVIL” 
Despite its many embarrassing spokespersons and its many formidable opponents, evil 
has continued to be a resilient and rewarding subject for philosophical reflection.  The 
recent “war on evil,” if one can call it that, has attracted many supporters, thanks in no 
small part because of the dominant associations of “evil” with two figures quite 
unfashionable today: the Devil and George W. Bush.  Many people have rightly pointed 
to the ideological and destructive use that can be made of the word “evil” when it is used 
to dehumanize one’s enemies or to demonize them.  The first route, taken to reduce one’s 
enemies to “evil” personified, to a kind of agency or force that cannot be reckoned with 
according to the laws and norms of modern society, has been attacked so widely and 
gained such currency that in a recent interview with Charlie Rose, the actress Tilda 
Swinton, in a discussion of her recent film We Need to Talk about Kevin, made a quite 
indignant and forceful argument for removing the word evil from our vocabulary.24  
 The current climate makes anyone thinking of using the term evil, let alone trying 
to reflect on it and say what it might be or mean, a little hesitant and slightly 
uncomfortable about keeping this word in one’s moral vocabulary.  When the word evil 
is used in conversation (except casually or in jest), the faces of one’s listeners tend to 
soften up a little, foreheads may wrinkle, and a number of underhanded jokes using the 
term evil in either of the senses discussed above, as a demonic force or George Bush’s 
axis of evil, may follow.  It is a testament to the amount of misuse and abuse the term has 
                                                
24 Charlie Rose’s interview with Swinton is available to view online at 
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/12127. 
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been subject to that this is the response one frequently meets when employing the term.  
No such skeptical or sardonic response is encountered when evil’s frequent counterpart, 
“good,” is used (or other terms like right or just or best), despite the vulnerability of so 
many other terms that are also ill-understood and misused in any number of ways. 
 This partially justified skepticism should teach us that the term evil should not be 
used carelessly, and that if one is to continue to use it in one’s moral judgments one must 
think seriously about the terms we are using when we speak about “evil.”  Evil is, as 
Marcus Singer observes, “the worst possible term of opprobrium imaginable,”25 a term 
we reserve for the worst sorts of wrongs, a judgment that makes the action or agent who 
is the subject of opprobrium inexcusable and unforgivable.  This is no small part of the 
reason the term has been recently met with skepticism, since the degree of judgment 
employed can often seem totally out of proportion and unreasonably harsh and cold.  
 On one side, then, are those who think we should drop the notion of evil from our 
moral vocabulary altogether, mainly because it seems to preclude human understanding 
and reasonable moral judgment.  On the other side, there are those who continue to 
employ the concept of evil but insist that we can never understand evil or why people 
commit horrific evils.  On this view, to try to explain or understand evil is to excuse evil, 
to make the evildoer’s actions no longer judged as evil, to rationalize them or make these 
actions seem perfectly intelligible.  In a perceptive essay on Kant's account of radical 
evil, Allen Wood describes this response to the attempt to understand evil as follows: 
“The basic problem about the intelligibility of evil can be stated in the form of a simple 
                                                
25 Marcus Singer, “The Concept of Evil,” Philosophy 79 (2004), p. 185 
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dilemma: There are apparently only two things we might mean by ‘explaining’ evil or 
‘making evil intelligible.’ One would be an explanation of it as an action that is done for 
reasons. The other would be a causal explanation of it as arising from antecedent 
conditions. Either explanation, however, if fully successful, would abolish what is evil 
about the action or display it as something that is not evil after all.”26  While this 
objection to all explanations of evil has its dangerous implications, including 
undermining a serious historical and moral examination of horrendous evils,27 at least 
some forms of this view might be ones that Kant (and we) might find compelling, views 
which insist that we must try to understand but will never be able to make intelligible or 
comprehensible why people could perform such horrific and cruel actions, what the 
experiences of the victims might have been like, and how a benevolent and all-powerful 
God could allow such evils to be so pervasive.28   
While speaking about evil may cause respectable people to blush, what is more 
perplexing is the widespread neglect of the topic of evil by the most prominent moral 
philosophers of the 20th century.  If we imagine ourselves reading the most influential 
works in Anglo-American moral philosophy over the last 75 years or so without 
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27 See the historian Yehuda Bauer’s essay “Against Mystification” in his book The Holocaust in 
Historical Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982) for a strong case against 
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knowledge of what actually took place in the 20th century, we might think that the 20th 
century was a rather peaceful, non-violent, stable, and blissful period where all that 
philosophers needed to reflect on was how we can get that much closer to being fully 
good, virtuous, rational, moral persons, rather than how we are to make sense of the 
prevalence of evil, injustice, and widespread suffering caused by human beings against 
other human beings.  Despite Hannah Arendt’s prediction,29 the most important and 
widely discussed problem in 20th century moral philosophy was certainly not the problem 
of evil. 
But there have been a number of significant figures over the last few decades who 
have been preoccupied with the problem of evil -- a list that would include many 
prominent figures in philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic, many political theorists 
working on human rights and recent atrocities, and also many of those working as 
historians, perhaps in particular those working on Nazi Germany.  I will join here with 
this line of thinkers, historians, and writers in being very concerned with evils, not just by 
morality generically.  As Levinas testified to, what may be of the utmost importance then 
is whether we have the philosophical and ethical resources to deal with evil during dark 
times (e.g. as even Germany, "the land of Kant and Goethe," did not), and to stand on a 
                                                
29 Immediately after the war, Arendt declared, “The problem of evil will be the fundamental 
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See Arendt, “Nightmare and Flight,” reprinted in 
Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954. Ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, 1994), p. 134.  As 
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Hannah Arendt Change Her Mind? From Radical Evil to the Banality of Evil,” in Hannah Arendt: 
Twenty Years Later. Eds. Larry May and Jerome Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 
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firm ethical foundation in making moral judgments, identifying evil and condemning it 
and fighting it.  As Levinas's philosophical project also demonstrates, reflection on evil, 
on inter-subjective violence, is vital if we are to understand ourselves as ethical beings 
and not ignore our most recent history and retreat into abstractions as though history has 
no hold on our understanding of human existence. If for no other reason, we should 
perhaps draw our attention to clarifying the notion of evil because the phenomenon of 
evildoing will undoubtedly continue to exist and trouble us, and because the notion 
continues to be employed to justify or disguise much serious wrongdoing.   
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EVIL AS A MORAL – NOT AN EXPLANATORY – CONCEPT 
Kuehn offers an insightful historical discussion on the reasons the idea of evil has 
declined in stature in the recent history of philosophy, leading to the almost total 
disregard of evil by contemporary Anglo-American philosophers.  Of utmost importance 
for Western philosophy's thinking about evil is the way that the idea of evil was initially 
shaped as a primarily negative concept, as the absence of something - usually the good or 
some goods such as knowledge or virtue.  For Plato's Socrates and the Augustine of the 
early church, evil is defined quite firmly as something lacking any reality, not as a real 
force or motive in the will but as something having "no being" and merely the absence of 
good or of knowledge.  While this understanding of evil was meant to combat dualism, 
gnosticism, and other views which gave evil a mythical or larger than life standing and 
often led to a very untidy view of God and the world, the conception of evil as privation 
has its problems too, ones that have become obvious for 20th century philosophers who 
have found little in this tradition to help us understand recent evils and evildoers.  As 
Kuehn writes, "When Plato, Augustine, Leibniz and Arendt maintain that evil has 'no 
being,' and that, as something purely negative, it cannot be clearly defined, they point 
towards this difficulty [presented by metaphysical, positive conceptions of evil], but it 
seems to me, that they go too far.'"30  As Kuehn suggests, by making evil something non-
essential and only an absence, these philosophers have in effect denied the existence of 
real, active moral evil of the kind we can no longer deny, and in doing so have made evil 
into something unworthy of serious philosophical investigation. 
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Continuing his brief history of the reasons evil has been largely neglected by 
contemporary philosophers, Kuehn writes,  
"The majority of thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were unified 
in thinking that the problem of human existence turns on the relationship between 
good and bad, not good and evil, and that the latter terms are something we have 
inherited from a bad sort of metaphysics, something which has continuously led 
us into error, and something which must be overcome. It has therefore been 
historically irrelevant whether one was a socialist, Marxist, or liberal when it 
came to rejecting the pairing of good and evil: once 'evil' is considered to be 
something antiquated and outdated, it becomes useless if one is intent on 
improving the human condition. This is the real reason that the problem of evil 
'has gotten lost' in philosophy. Evil has lost its place in the philosophical 
discussion as a result of deliberation, not thoughtlessness. Indeed, neither Marx 
nor Rawls could do much with such a concept, and we find 'evil' only mentioned, 
if at all, as a peripheral problem in their works."31   
 
Most recently, then, evil has been considered mainly as a derivative notion, taking a back 
seat to theories of justice, the good, right action, and so on. 
 To discover if the notion of evil can indeed prove useful (contra Rawls, Marx, and 
others) in improving our understanding of the human condition, the first task confronting 
any philosophical account of evil is then to try to determine if there is something that the 
                                                
31 Ibid., p. 141 
31 
 
predicate evil can really pick out.  The question that then arises is whether there is some 
class of phenomena that the term evil captures more precisely than the other terms of our 
moral vocabulary like good and bad, wrong, and unjust.  This question should not be 
confused for or get too tied down in the broader debate over moral realism, i.e. whether 
there are moral properties or moral facts out there in the world that can be objectively 
described and employed in moral judgments.  The various positions taken in regard to 
objectivist and subjectivist views of the nature of moral reasons and judgments, the 
various considerations that have led some to adopt emotivism, anti-realism, various 
formulations of realism (substantive, procedural, quasi), and so on, are all issues rightly 
taken seriously by many doing Anglo-American ethics today.  However, in this paper I 
will try to offer an account that does not take a stance or beg the question on the issues 
involved in these current debates (whose relevance to my account of evil is, on my view, 
quite secondary or is at least partially diffused by offering a plausible account of evil). 
 Returning to the question of the use of “evil” in our moral judgments, what sorts 
of subjects (individuals, political entities, states of affairs) might be picked out or 
accurately described by the term "evil?" Is such a predicate a plausible and logically 
coherent and informative notion or property to apply to objects, one that picks out a 
quality distinct from other moral properties/concepts?  Now we need a little help to begin 
our search for what the predicate “evil” might pick out.  Looking back at the history of 
the concept of evil, without too much difficulty one notices that evil has typically been 
used as the worst form of moral opprobrium and has always been used to refer the worst 
sorts of wrongdoing, vices, and persons, regardless of what specific content the term was 
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given in a given case.  This is an important observation, one which allows us to perhaps 
find what lies at the bottom of the concept of evil and can be seen as its fairly consistent, 
unified meaning across the various more substantive (second-order) historical 
conceptions of exactly what evil is.  Thus, preliminary observation might be seen as 
grounding the rough, intuitive meaning of evil, a meaning which still has currency with 
us today and may very well be what we commonly mean by evil: evil is the worst sort of 
wrong or vice that an action, agent, institutions, and so on, can possess.   
 But what kinds of things can rightly said to be evil?  At this point we must first 
pause to acknowledge that the term evil is supposed to refer to something quite distinct – 
the worst sorts of wrongdoing and harm that stand out from lesser wrongdoing.  The class 
of things that evil accurately describes is thus a real, distinct set of phenomena, widely 
acknowledged and observed, phenomena which leaves us often without words except for 
“evil,” the only term that comes close to describing these horrific wrongs.  In sum, it 
appears that the predicate “evil” can pick out a certain class of phenomena probably as 
clearly and coherently as other concepts or predicates in ordinary moral judgment.  We 
can be saying something meaningful, informative, and illuminating by describing an 
action, person, institution, or society as evil.  Most importantly, there is a fairly obvious 
position in our intellectual and moral framework that the concept of evil helps to fill, as it 
enables us to describe and explain the worst sorts of wrongdoing which are not captured 
by other terms in our moral vocabulary.   
 In addition to these more metaethical considerations which give us good reason to 
think that the concept of evil really does pick out some important phenomena, there are 
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several further justifications for not discarding the term from our moral vocabulary.  
Indeed, there is much to be said about in favor of keeping the term “evil” in our 
vocabularies if we are to have any hope of understanding, assessing, and responding with 
clarity and intelligence to the sorts of phenomena appropriately described as evil.   
 We can begin with a consideration of our philosophical and intellectual tradition, 
a tradition or history which we need of course feel no obligation to but that we must 
nevertheless recognize as enduring and resilient in many instances.  In the case of the 
history of the concept of evil, as briefly described above, evil has enjoyed an enduring 
and somewhat consistent use across western philosophy to refer to the really bad things 
and actions in the world which cannot be excused.  Earlier accounts of evil like Saint 
Augustine’s might have conceived of evil in much more inclusive terms, encompassing 
more than just the worst sorts of wrongs we now typically think of as evil.  In addition, 
while there is no question that there are important differences between traditions and 
schools and civilizations in regards to their conceptions of evil, what almost universally 
underlies these various conceptions is the use the term evil is given in picking out the 
wrongs that are cause for most serious concern and condemnation. 
   Being hesitant therefore to dismiss the serious reflections on evil so important to 
many figures in the history of western philosophy is justified by this shared basic 
conception of evil.  It also helps prevent us from losing much of the ethical and moral 
theory in the history of philosophy, dismissed in part because of the primacy of an 
account of evil in their ethics.  Perhaps we will be able to recover resources and 
inspirations that often receive little attention in contemporary attempts to come up with a 
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viable moral theory, efforts that often seem quite bloodless and inadequate in accounting 
for the full range of right and wrong actions, motives, institutions, persons, etc., which 
needless to say will require reflection on the kind of evils which many philosophers have 
rightly reflected on. 
 Another important reason to not discard evil from our moral vocabulary is the 
inability of other terms to capture this distinct class of serious wrongs.  Now this might at 
first seem like yet another attempt to give license to the philosopher’s tendency to distort 
the phenomena so that he can have his neat, coherent theory and convince himself that he 
understands and grasps something which he really does not in the least understand.  
Following this line of thought, perhaps we would be better off only using more untainted 
and specific terms for the kinds of phenomena we may think “evil” accurately describes: 
terms such as wickedness, barbarity, sadism, cruelty, monstrous, horrific, inexplicable, 
unjustifiable, and so on.  But pick whichever of these terms you’d like; they will likely be 
found to either used to pick out a too narrow class of wrongs, or they will end up 
(defectively) functioning as a notion intended to describe a large class of things through a 
similarly broad meaning or analysis.  While the wish to use a more untainted term is 
understandable, there is not much point in simply verbally substituting one term for 
another when both terms are intended to pick out more or less the same things and have a 
similar conceptual structure.  Perhaps these terms are less tainted or controversial, but it 
is not clear that they are able to pick out the very same kinds of things that we have been 
arguing that judgments of evil do, serious harms caused by inexcusable wrongdoing.  The 
terms may move to a greater level of precision or concreteness in specifying the kind of 
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harm caused or the psychological motives of the wrongdoer, but the rough class of things 
remains the same or ends up being much too narrow.  In other words, these alternative 
terms play a distant second best to evil in bringing together various kinds of actions under 
a helpful, illuminating, unified account, which evil might be able to do.  Lastly, the terms 
in question are equally vulnerable to distorting the phenomena in question, as is 
evidenced by our all too flippant or careless use of these terms as well.  We need an 
account of evil to therefore be nuanced enough to at least broadly distinguished from 
these other terms (e.g. cruelty, oppression, malevolence, wickedness, grave injustice, 
barbarity, inhumanity), while not being a reductive or exhaustive catch-all so easy to 
abuse. 
 Third, discarding evil from our moral vocabulary may also lead us to be blind or 
less responsive to great suffering often described as evil.  At an extreme, skepticism and 
cynicism towards the idea of evil can lead one to think that the phenomena in question do 
not really transgress all moral boundaries in the ways some may judge, which when taken 
too far can lead to a stance that is complacent and indifferent in the face of extreme 
wrongdoing. In particular, when we become too hesitant to use the term evil, preferring 
to call the horrific wrongs before our eyes “unjust” or “inexplicable” or “deeply 
disturbing,” there is a danger that we flatten out, rob, or take the sting out of our moral 
judgments and a key way of seeing, condemning, and responding to such kinds of 
wrongdoing.  At an extreme, imposing too much restraint on one's moral vocabulary may 
seriously hamper us as we try to understand and respond to the evil in the world.  And 
unfortunately, because some wrongs are worse than others, we often must make choices 
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about which wrongs to prioritize in our actions and reflections.  As Claudia Card writes, 
“The temptation is often to address lesser wrongs first, deferring indefinitely attention to 
lesser evils.  Lesser wrongs can be easier to repair.  Evils are urgent.  Life and basic 
quality of life are at stake.”32  
 A further defense for continuing to employ the concept of evil is related to not 
being apologetic that evil is a historical, culturally-shaped concept like many other 
concepts.  Viewed from this perspective, one which could be further explored through the 
lens of hermeneutics, evil is a concept that we employ to make sense of things, it is a 
meaning-making concept, a concept which we should investigate for its function and 
meaning to us rather than some sort of analytic or conceptual power to explain "facts."  
This may seem a large admission, but only if one thinks of evil as some sort of force or 
principle or entity, something that is not to be reduced to some pitiable thing like a 
concept which we have constructed and employ in our all-too human judgments.  With 
the account offered here, we are not denying that evil is a historically-shaped and 
determined concept, with many different meanings and components that are in conflict 
with one another, with one component rising to the foreground at one time and place and 
another in another time and place.  Nietzsche, who offered one of the greatest critiques of 
the use of the term “evil” was right about at least this much.33  The account offered here 
may in fact have the comparatively modest goal, following Nietzsche, of simply trying to 
determine what the contemporary intuitive understanding of evil is, then going on to 
                                                
32 Claudia Card, Confronting Evils, p. 7 
33 See, in particular, Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, the First Essay, “’Good and Evil’, 
‘Good and Bad.’” 
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make some necessary clarifications and modifications to it, before considering whether 
this conception is useful and healthy, intellectually and psychologically, in helping us 
interpret and live in our world. 
 Finally, it is simply very difficult and counterintuitive to abolish a term that has 
had such traction and importance across time and across many intellectual paradigms, 
across so many cultures and religions and worldviews, and which continues to be used so 
frequently today.  Of course "evil" has been understood in many incompatible ways 
across these various traditions, and there have been many undeniably false and deeply 
misleading conceptions of evil, but these mistaken accounts should not sway us from 
trying to come up with a better, more plausible and coherent account of evil that can 
stand reflection and make sense of our intuitions and moral judgements about evil.   
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KANT'S ACCOUNT OF RADICAL EVIL: EVIL AS A SECULAR, MORAL 
PROBLEM 
As discussed already, concentrated philosophical work on evil has become rarer and rarer 
since the late 18th century.  Rather than devote attention to evil and the problems it raises 
for ethics, theology, and philosophy, most philosophers have preferred to change the 
subject to other topics.  But as Susan Neiman's book Evil in Modern Thought 
demonstrates, evil and the vastness of undeserved human suffering has continued to 
preoccupy philosophers searching for a way to make the world around them seem 
intelligible.  In an important and ambitious project, Neiman attempts to retrace a 
continuing line of thought devoted to struggling with evil, a continuing problem which 
can be seen in the work of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche, and Arendt, 
and in recent philosophy.  While many of these reflections on evil remain largely 
untapped, as Neiman, whose first book was on Kant, well understands, there is no 
contribution more important than the the one made by Kant.  For Kant, the existence of 
moral evil posed an array of theoretical and practical dilemmas that he recognized were 
in dire need of addressing if his ambitious philosophical project was to succeed. 
 Recognizing the debts owed to Kant's account for opening up new understandings 
of evil, in this section of the paper I will devote some space to reconstructing and 
sympathetically interpreting Kant’s theory of evil. I will offer this interpretation of the 
Kantian theory of radical evil by arguing that Kant raised most of the important questions 
that moral evil confronts us with.  I will then argue that the solutions he gave to these 
problems, though insufficient, provide the foundations of a nuanced, far-reaching 
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understanding of evil, one which acknowledges the need to address the phenomenon of 
evil if one is to have anything meaningful to contribute to moral and political philosophy. 
I will attempt to show that among other strengths, Kant’s theory of evil convincingly 
addresses many of the pressing questions raised by the reality of evil in the 20th century, 
including questions related to the nature of evil actions and evil persons, the roots of evil 
in human nature and the maxims of evildoers, the social and political conditions that 
make the sort of large-scale collective evils of the 20th century possible, and how far evil 
can be made intelligible but never fully understood.  In reconstructing and defending 
Kant’s account of evil, I hope to show just how relevant Kant’s theory of evil remains for 
us today, and how although we may now understand evil differently than Kant did, it is 
the notion of radical evil that remains most valuable in our search for a contemporary 
conception of evil. 
For many of those inclined to defend Kant’s project, the account of “radical evil” 
given in the first chapter of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone confronts them 
with a difficult and somewhat embarrassing task: the task of explaining how Kant’s 
account of “radical evil” lines up with the rest of Kant’s fairly tidy, secular, humanistic, 
and groundbreaking Enlightenment moral philosophy.34  In an effort to avoid confronting 
this somewhat embarrassing task, many Kantians simply leave out Kant’s account of 
                                                
34 See, for example, Gordon E. Michalson’s admission in the preface to his book on Kant’s theory 
of radical evil, Fallen Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), that he felt a 
tinge of embarrassment for many years when trying to answer questions by students who were 
trying to make sense of what Kant says about evil in the Religion. 
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radical evil in their defenses and reconstructions of a Kantian ethics.35 It may be true that 
Kant does some damage by amending the rigorous and systematic ethical system we find 
in the Groundwork and the Critiques by offering his late account of radical evil.  But by 
confronting the reality and apparent unintelligibility of evil, Kant comes close to 
completing the task he and other moral philosophers have set out to do: to present a full 
account of the ethical life, a life which undeniably includes a great amount of evil, vice, 
injustice, serious wrongdoing, and the related feelings of shame, remorse, and guilt. 
 As Kant points out in the opening paragraph of his chapter on radical evil in the 
Religion, all ages have recognized the reality of evil, “that the world lieth in evil,”36 and 
have in their myths, narratives, poetry, and religious practices made evil a reality to be 
reflected on, wrestled with, and somehow understood.37  Although Kant takes the nearly 
universal concern with evil across literatures and times as grounds for taking evil 
seriously, it is not merely the prevalence of evil in the world or in world literature that led 
Kant to his reflections on radical evil.  Rather, to Kant's credit, he realized that there were 
gaps in his account of morality, practical reason, and freedom brought out most clearly by 
the existence of the free choice of immoral actions and evildoing.   
                                                
35 Exceptions to this tendency, however, include many of the most important recent contributors 
to Kant scholarship, including John Silbur, Henry Allison, Allen Wood, Manfred Kuehn, and 
Robert Louden, among others. 
36 Cite passage 
37 See Jeffrey Burton Russell’s multi-volume history of the figure of Satan in which he shows 
how going all the way back to earliest remains from antiquity, evil has been personified in the 
figure of the devil or in another fearsome entity, and has formed an important part of the 
worldview for nearly all religions and peoples: The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to 
Primitive Christianity (Ithaca: Cornell, 1977); Satan: The Early Christian Tradition (Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1981); Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, Cornell, 1984); Mephistopheles: 
the Devil in the Modern World (Ithaca, Cornell, 1986). 
41 
 
 Perhaps the biggest problem that Kant had failed to fully address prior to the 
Religion is how it could be that people freely choose evil or immoral actions and maxims, 
since for Kant "freedom" consists in following the moral law.  Revisiting a problem that 
reaches all the way back to Plato, Kant's account raised questions about whether we can 
freely act wrongly (or in violation of the moral law) and therefore be held morally 
responsible.  To remedy these defects of his account, in the Religion Kant introduces the 
distinction between "freedom" and "free choice," Wille and Willkur, and discusses what 
he calls "the human propensity to evil" and "the radical evil lying in human nature."  
Freedom, or Wille, on Kant's account, is the capacity to act in accordance with law, more 
importantly a law one recognizes as valid for oneself as an autonomous human agent. 
Free choice, or Willkur, on the other hand, is the faculty of free choice, a basic faculty 
which we employ in almost all of our up coerced actions. This distinction is crucial for 
Kant, as it points to how an evil action, or one in conscious violation of the moral law, is 
in one sense free but in another sense lacks the kind of freedom or autonomy distinctive 
in a Kantian ethics. 
 The late Kant scholar John Silber was among the first of Kant's readers to fully 
appreciate the problems Kant tackles only in the Religion and drew attention to the 
nuanced account of Wille and Willkur offered there.38 As Silbur pointed out, among other 
contributions to a Kantian ethics, we look to the Religion to find resources for a Kantian 
moral psychology, for an understanding of the inclination of self-love which plays such a 
                                                
38 See Silber's essay "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," in Religion Within the Limits 
of Reason Alone, Edited by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (Harper: New York: 1960). 
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large role in Kant's account of acting morally or for the sake of duty, and for an 
understanding of what prevents us from acting according to the moral law.  Unlike many 
moral philosophers, Kant dwells on the problems immorality presents to his account of 
the moral life (although as we will see he mainly forces his account of evil to conform to 
the confines of the account of duty and freedom that he has already defended in his 
earlier most famous works in moral theory). 
 In looking to Kant's account of radical evil, we should first remind ourselves that 
an adequate philosophical account of evil will (at the very least) do the following: first, it 
will offer an analysis of the concept of evil, what we currently mean when we use the 
term in moral judgments (and also how our current understanding of the concept of evil 
differs from previous conceptions); second, it will offer an account of why evil is so 
prevalent and the conditions under which evil actions are possible.  Wood describes this 
two-part approach to the problem of moral evil in relation to how Kant systematically 
sets up his account of evil:  “When I speak about our questions concerning evil, what I 
mean is such questions as these: What, at bottom, does such conduct consist in?  And 
how, if at all, can we make sense of it?  How can people do such things?  How should we 
understand the power and prevalence of evil?  And how should this understanding 
influence our struggle against evil?”39  Kant’s account of evil is divided quite plausibly 
along these lines into two parts and two sorts of questions: first, regarding the concept of 
evil, i.e. a definition or analysis of the concept of evil, a set of conditions for an act or 
person to be evil, and then secondly, into an account of the propensity to evil, why people 
                                                
39 "Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil,” p. 145 
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perform evil deeds.  Wood calls Kant’s division of his account and the solutions he gives 
to these questions “the maxim problem” and “the propensity problem.” 
 Unlike many accounts of evil which define evil primarily in terms of evil actions 
or evils suffered, for Kant evil is primarily a matter of what he calls an agent's general 
underlying moral disposition, or Gesinnung.  Kant argues that “we call a man evil, 
however, not because he performs actions that are evil (contrary to law) but because these 
actions are of such a nature that we may infer from them the presence in him of evil 
maxims.”40  In other words, evil persons commit evil actions, and it is by observing the 
performance of these evil actions that we can come to reasonable conclusions that a 
person is evil.41  As Kant writes, “In order, then, to call a man evil, it would have to be 
possible a priori to infer from several evil acts done with consciousness of their evil, of 
from one such act, an underlying evil maxim; and further, from this maxim to infer the 
presence in the agent of an underlying common ground, itself a maxim, of all particular 
morally-evil maxims.”42  Evil therefore is something that lies only within the will of a 
free moral agent, within the intentions and motives, the volitions or “maxims”43 as Kant 
                                                
40 Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. 
Hudson (Harper: New York: 1960), p. 16 
41 While he does not say a whole lot about Kant’s account of evil, Marcus Singer gives a similar 
account of evil persons in his essay “The Concept of Evil." 
42 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 16 
43 Barbara Herman gives a helpful definition of a maxim in The Practice of Moral Judgment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993): “Maxims are those underlying principles or 
intentions by which we guide and control our more specific intentions” (84). 
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calls them, of an agent: “Hence the source of evil…can lie only in a rule made by the will 
for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim.”44   
A person is evil, therefore, insofar as he or she has adopted an underlying evil 
maxim, a disposition in which the roles of the moral law and inclination have been 
inverted -- where the moral law is as a rule subordinated to inclination, the non-moral.  
Kant defines a disposition as “the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of 
maxims.”45  This disposition, or the subjective ground from which a person acts, is either 
good or evil; there is no middle ground for Kant, either the moral law is overriding and 
supreme or non-moral inclination is made overriding or supreme in a maxim.  As Kant 
writes of the evil disposition, “This can only happen when a man adopts this incentive 
(and thereby the deviation from the moral law) into his maxim (in which case he is an 
evil man) it follows that his disposition in respect to the moral law is never indifferent, 
never neither good nor evil.”46  While such a subordination of the moral to the non-moral 
is of course quite common, it is nevertheless in an important sense unreasonable.  For 
Kant, evil is something we always have decisive reason not to do.  The moral law always 
give us decisive reason to act in a certain way, to act according to duty; and therefore to 
perform evil deeds or deeds which are based on a maxim reversing the proper 
relationship of the moral and non-moral are in an important sense unreasonable – 
defective acts of rational, autonomous moral agents.  Kant does not, however, deny that 
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45 Ibid., 20 
46 Ibid. 
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much of the evil that human beings perform is rationally motivated, or done according to 
some sort of (non-moral) reasons.  
 Having laid out this analysis of the concept of evil, of what evil consists in, Kant 
must now address questions regarding what precisely lies at the bottom of an evil 
person’s maxims and choices. Kant is in a good position to pursue these sorts of 
questions by virtue of his ability to frame the problem in terms of the maxims on which 
people act and their underlying motives and dispositions.  In particular, Kant has many of 
the conceptual tools to examine what happens at the level of the underlying motive or 
character of an evildoer.  This overall moral disposition or state of character, while 
sometimes not the only thing we mean by “evil,” is certainly one of the main things we 
mean by the term “evil” and what we try to understand how people could perform such 
horrific actions.  Wood calls Kant’s formulation of this problem “the maxim problem.”47 
 For Kant, the evil maxim is one which subordinates the moral law to inclination, 
to the non-moral: “Man is evil only in that he reverses the moral order of the incentives 
when he adopts them into his maxim.  He adopts, indeed, the moral law along with the 
law of self-love; yet when he becomes aware that they cannot remain on a par with each 
other but that one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes 
the incentive of self-love and its inclinations the conditions of obedience to the moral 
law; whereas, on the contrary, the latter, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of 
the former, ought to have been adopted into the universal maxim of the will as the sole 
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incentive.”48  Examining this definition of the evil maxim and of the evil person, we 
might wonder if such a maxim is really "evil" in the sense we reserve for the term. The 
maxim and the acts following from it that Kant describes might seem merely non-moral 
or of no moral worth on Kant's rigorous account, perhaps bad or wrong in many cases but 
still not on the level of what we normally view as the truly evil.  Thus Kant seems to go 
too far in identifying as evil almost any subordination of the moral to the non-moral. 
 Given these fairly easily detected difficulties facing Kant’s definition of the evil 
maxim, why would he have chosen to define the evil maxim in this fairly broad, all-
encompassing sense?  There are at least three important advantages to conceiving of evil 
in this broad way. First, this broad definition of the evil maxim should help us to reach an 
analysis of the concept of evil that captures what evil consists in at the most fundamental 
level, and therefore to establish what it is that holds all evil actions together.  Second, 
such a broad definition of evil will be able to account for a diverse range of motives and 
incentives as being the maxim upon which people perform evil deeds.  Evil deeds and 
evil persons may be motivated by sheer malevolence, sadism, or cruelty, but it is much 
more often the all-too-human motives of envy, resentment, desire, cowardice, greed, etc. 
which lie beneath evil actions.  Kant's account appreciates this important fact about 
evildoers and makes room for understanding how ordinary people can perform such 
horrible acts out of simple weakness, conformity to authority, collective hysteria, etc.  It 
is an undeniable fact that the kind of large-scale, collectively-perpetrated evils of the 20th 
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century depended on the willing participation ordinary people and not just the most evil 
of villains.49 
 On the other end of things, we might think that Kant’s definition of evil does not 
go far enough in allowing for the possibility of a phenomenon we can no longer deny (as 
many philosophers following Plato had done), that some people do evil for evil’s sake or 
because of the harm the action causes without any comprehensible benefit to the evildoer.  
But when we read Kant carefully we can see that he does acknowledge the possibility of 
what we ordinarily mean by “doing evil for evil’s sake” in this sense. The problem for 
Kant with the notion of absolutely diabolical evil, understood in his terms as the adoption 
of a maxim in which evil is more or less the only principle or maxim which exists for an 
agent, is that such an agent is not capable of acting morally and therefore cannot be called 
evil in the moral, evaluative sense.  Because the moral law has somehow been eliminated 
from his or her set of inclinations or considerations, such a person is hard to conceive as 
being capable of distinguishing good from evil, of being held morally accountable, and 
therefore of being evil in the important, evaluative moral sense.  As Wood further 
explains: “Kant’s argument is that it would be incoherent to suppose a being could be 
responsible for obeying the moral law and yet lack any rational incentive to obey the law, 
possessing originally only a rational incentive to disobey it….These impossibilities are 
what Kant rejects under the heading of a ‘diabolical will’ – not because it represents 
something ‘too evil’ for human nature, but because it would be incoherent to condemn as 
                                                
49 For an important and groundbreaking case study of the kinds of “ordinary men” who did much 
of the most brutal and horrendous face-to-face killing of the Nazi genocide, see Christopher 
Browning, Ordinary Men (New York: Harper Collins, 1992). 
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evil the choices of a being that could recognize no decisive reason to choose in favor of 
morality. Whatever harm to human or other beings might be caused by the actions of 
such a being, they could not be considered evil.”50  But Kant can explain the undeniable 
occurrence of “evil for evil’s sake,” those actions which are done from a (purely) wicked 
intention.  As Wood argues, “Kant does not deny, however, that these inclinations can 
attract us to conduct that is directly contrary to what morality requires (that they might be 
empirical desires for ‘evil as evil’). For example, the moral law requires us to make the 
happiness of others our end and so forbids us to take their unhappiness as an end for its 
own sake. What Kant calls the ‘vices of hatred’ or ‘diabolical vices’ – envy, ingratitude, 
and malice – are vices because they involve making the unhappiness of another directly 
an end. This looks like ‘evil for evil’s sake’ if anything could be.”51   
 Putting aside many interpretive issues mainly of interest to Kant scholars, we 
might still worry that Kant does not adequately distinguish the "truly evil" from the 
“merely bad.”  While Kant does not always do a very good job of distinguishing what we 
might see as evil from the merely bad, he does distinguish between "degrees of evil" and 
his account of the three degrees of evil might help us to define the merely bad as distinct 
from the “truly evil.”  Kant argues that “in this capacity for evil there can be 
distinguished three distinct degrees” – “frailty,” “impurity,” and “wickedness.” Frailty is 
“the weakness of the human heart in the general observance of adopted maxims”; it is 
manifested when the moral incentive is weaker than the incentive from inclination (e.g. 
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when the sensual overpowers the moral).  Impurity is “the propensity for mixing unmoral 
with moral motivating causes (even when it is done with good intent and under maxims 
of the good)”; it is manifested when the moral incentive is present but is not sufficient to 
move us, when we need additional non-moral incentives to do the right thing, or more 
generally when we act as Kant puts it "according to duty but not from duty."  Wickedness 
is “the propensity to adopt evil maxims”; it is the “corruption of the human heart” or “the 
propensity of the will to maxims which neglect the incentives springing from the moral 
law in favor of others which are not moral.”  Wickedness reverses what ought to be the 
order of the will and is in this sense the perversity of the will; in neglecting or 
subordinating the moral, the will of the wicked person is corrupted at its root.52 
 Wood argues that Kant’s distinction between degrees of evil lines up pretty well 
with our common sense notions of “the truly evil” and “the merely bad:"  “Kant of course 
recognizes that some cases of evil are worse than others….The ‘diabolical vices’ of 
hatred, which take the unhappiness of another as an end for its own sake, are clearly 
worse in his view than minor transgressions resulting from the indulgence of an 
inclination, not discreditable in itself, that prevents us from doing something we should 
have done. But when it comes to the concept of evil itself, his aim is to bring all cases of 
it – whatever their degree – under a single concept, a single maxim of evil, a maxim that 
applies in the same way to minor evils as it does to the worst evils."53 
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 Wood also points out that while Kant’s distinguishes degrees of evil he also 
brings them all together under the category of evil, an important feature of Kant’s 
account which makes us look into ourselves for the sources of evil and not merely in 
others or at the most notorious of evildoers:  
 
"I think it is both significant and commendable that Kant refuses to cater to our 
prurient craving for a special account that applies especially to the most extreme 
cases of evil. While recognizing that there can be both 'diabolical' vices and 
'angelic' virtues, Kant discourages us from looking at people as exemplifications 
of them. He fears that occupying our imaginations with extreme cases of evil may 
be merely a way of indulging some of our nastier human traits – rationalizing our 
resentment and vindictiveness by supplying it with an object that would seem to 
justify it. Further, to think that extreme cases of evil represent something morally, 
psychologically, or even metaphysically special may be merely a way of 
rationalizing our own transgressions. We want to think that the true monster of 
evil (Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, Hannibal Lecter, Dick Cheney) has little in 
common with our petty failings and vices. The image of such monsters also helps 
us to divide all human beings into 'good people' and 'evil people,' providing our 
worldview with the 'moral clarity' conspicuously exhibited by some of these 
monsters themselves. Kant wants us to be mercilessly clear about right and wrong 
when it comes to our own actions, but he encourages an attitude of charitable 
moral ambiguity when it comes to judging others.  Thus Kant’s treatment of evil 
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is designed to make us aware of the continuity between different cases of evil, 
what cases of evil have in common (however they may differ in degree), and 
therefore aware of our kinship with other evildoers rather than our distance from 
them. The Kantian view is that to 'look evil straight in the face' is not to gaze in 
voluptuous horror at the visage of Hitler, but instead simply to look in the mirror, 
asking yourself honestly and soberly what you might do to improve what is 
there."54 
 
 Having offered this account of what the concept of evil consists in, Kant next 
confronts the prevalence of evil in the world through his discussion of “the propensity to 
evil,” or what Wood calls “the propensity problem.”  For Kant, a "propensity" (Hang) is a 
subjective ground or predisposition one has just by virtue of being a human being.55  The 
propensity to evil, then, is the propensity of human beings to invert the order of 
incentives and to subordinate moral duty to self-love or inclination.  While this 
propensity will be strongly present in nearly everyone, one need not actually act on this 
propensity, and it seems that because of this ability to resist evil one is still responsible 
for acting according to these propensities.  Kant famously calls the propensity to evil a 
“natural propensity:"  “If, then, this propensity can be considered as belonging 
universally to mankind (and hence as part of the character of the race), it may be called a 
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natural propensity in man to evil.”56  From this notion of a natural propensity to evil, 
Kant declares that there is a “radical evil” in human nature: Because this propensity to 
evil is rooted in human nature, “we can call this natural propensity to evil….a radical 
innate evil in human nature (yet none the less brought upon us by ourselves).”57  Since it 
is universal and rooted in human nature, evil is radical.  This definition of radical evil 
should not be confused as being identical with the notions of diabolical evil, wickedness, 
or the most extreme forms of evil (though it is easy to mistake Kant’s famous formulation 
of evil as radical to mean this).58 
 The notion of a propensity to evil is filled out at least in part by Kant in what 
Wood calls the notion of “unsociable sociability,” the idea that because of what Kant 
calls our "predisposition to humanity" -- our social needs of relating to and living with 
others -- we end up deriving much of our self-worth by comparing ourselves to others, a 
social condition by which vices such as envy, malevolence, greed, etc. inevitably arise. 
Of this disposition to humanity and to comparison and competition, Kant writes, “The 
predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is 
physical and yet compares; that is to say, we judge ourselves happy or unhappy only by 
making comparisons with others….This is originally a desire merely for equality, to 
allow no one superiority above oneself….but from this arises gradually the unjustifiable 
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as designating the worst and most 
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craving to win it for oneself over others.  Upon this twin stem of jealousy and rivalry may 
be grafted the very great vices of secret and open animosity against all whom we look 
upon as not belonging to us…Hence the vices which are grafted upon this inclination 
might be their termed vices of culture; in highest degree of malignancy, as, for example 
in envy, ingratitude, spitefulness….they can be called the diabolical vices.”59 It is the 
predisposition to humanity, Kant argues, which makes possible the propensity to commit 
evil acts against others; it is because of this propensity that human beings are naturally 
disposed to evil (just by virtue of human nature) and that evil is therefore radical. 
 Later in the Religion, Kant argues in the starkest of terms that it is this condition 
of relationship and competition with others that brings about the worst wrongs: “When he 
looks around for the causes and circumstances which expose him to this danger and keep 
him in it, he can easily convince himself that he is subject to these not because of his own 
gross nature, so far as he is here a separate individual, but because of mankind to whom 
he is related and bound….Envy, the lust for power, greed, and the malignant inclinations 
bound up with these, besiege his nature, content within itself, as soon as he is among 
men.  And it is not even necessary to assume that these are men sunk in evil and 
examples to lead him astray; it suffices that they are at hand, that they surround him, and 
that they are men, for them mutually to corrupt each other’s predispositions and make 
one another evil.”60  For Kant, therefore, it is because of this social condition that the 
worst evils are made possible: the sorts of evils that can only occur through collective 
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moral collapse, through social pressure and the pressure to conform, through excusing 
oneself because of the evil deeds others are committing around you, and through 
resentment, fear, and hatred of “the other.” 
 Kant’s reflections on the social conditions which make evil possible and indeed so 
prevalent may be able to help us understand the kind of evildoers that the 20th century has 
produced, those like Adolf Eichmann who led Hannah Arendt to her famous declaration 
that what is so striking about evil is its “banality.”61  With a clear picture of Kant’s 
account of radical evil set out, we can see that what at times is so radical about evil is 
precisely the banality of evildoers.  The nature of radical evil and banal, ordinary 
evildoers were tied together quite closely by Kant, as illustrated by his view of “radical 
evil” as rooted in human nature and ordinary human weakness.  Kant also appears to be 
well-positioned to explain how ordinary, non-malevolent people can be motivated by 
quite banal reasons to perform the most evil of tasks (indeed, Kant's account leaves one 
wondering if there is anyone who is not evil or at least capable of committing truly evil 
deeds).   
 Although we will have more to say about Eichmann later, Eichmann’s evil can be 
understood much as Arendt did if we apply Kant’s account.  Along these lines, we can 
say that Eichmann was evil in that he as a matter of course subordinated the moral law to 
self-interest, to being promoted in the Nazi hierarchy and being esteemed by his 
colleagues and others.  He was “thoughtless” in his neglecting the moral law and 
allowing it to be subordinated to his banal desires and ambitions.  He was evil, therefore, 
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in the sense that he knew (as he confessed at the trial in Jerusalem) what the moral law 
required of him, but he adopted a corrupt maxim as the foundation of all his actions.  This 
maxim was to do the Fuhrer’s will, to do his “duty” as a Nazi official; in his maxim the 
moral law and Nazi ideology were inverted, and in this sense his heart was wicked and 
his moral disposition fundamentally corrupted.  Because of this inversion in his character, 
one which no one forced upon him and one he was fully responsible for, Eichmann was 
an evil man and was able to perform the most evil of tasks calmly day after day despite 
not being the sort of “devil” we might have thought would be required of one of the most 
notorious evildoers of the 20th century. 
While Kant's account of radical evil continues to be influential, it is by no means 
without its detractors. Perhaps the most powerful and frequently invoked criticism of 
Kant's account is its apparent failure to face the kind of evil perpetrated by Kant's own 
country during the 20th century.  According to this frequent objection, Kant's account of 
evil fails to be radical enough. Despite her admiration for Kant, Hannah Arendt first 
voiced this criticism in a compelling discussion of the failure of our philosophical 
resources and traditions to make sense of Nazi evil.  As Arendt persuasively writes,  
 
"It is inherent in our entire philosophical tradition that we cannot conceive of a 
'radical evil,' and this is true both for Christian theology, which conceded even to 
the Devil himself a celestial origin, as well as for Kant, the only philosopher 
who, in the word he coined for it, at least must have suspected the existence of 
this evil even though he immediately rationalized it in the concept of a 'perverted 
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ill will' that could be explained by comprehensible motives. Therefore, we 
actually have nothing to fall back on in order to understand a phenomenon that 
nevertheless confronts us with its overpowering reality and breaks down all 
standards we know. There is only one thing that seems to be discernible: we may 
say that radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which all men 
have become equally superfluous."62   
 
In other words, Kant sensed the existence of something like absolute or radical evil but 
could not conceive of it in the terms of his moral-intellectual project. He was therefore 
forced to stay within the confines laid down by the philosophical tradition which 
downplayed the positive reality of evil, and therefore in the end he sticks to the relative 
comforts of the rest of his moral theory, restricting the motives of evil actions to the 
familiar inclinations of self-love and general moral weakness.63 
 More recently, John Silber has argued that Kant's account surely fails when 
confronted by the evil of those like Hitler, Himmler, and other figures from history and 
fiction. While Kant may be in a good position to illuminate the actions of an Eichmann 
and other major evildoers who may not have been devils, he has very few resources to 
offer us in understanding evildoers like Hitler, who seemed to pursue evil (i.e. the 
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63In the Eichmann book and later work, Arendt appears to abandon the notion of radical evil.  
Indeed, in her famous exchange of letters with Gershom Scholem, Arendt goes so far to explicitly 
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Interrogation (Polity: Cambridge, MA, 2002). 
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gratuitous destruction of an entire people) for its own sake, who saw his own greatness in 
terms of the evil that he made his overriding aim.64 
While Kant may have been insufficiently clear on what he means by diabolical 
evil, offering not much more than a caricature in speaking about devilish beings, it is 
worth taking his argument here seriously.  What Kant seems to mean, and which is easy 
to miss in reading his brief discussion of diabolical evil in the Religion, is that for 
someone to go so far as to no longer recognize the validity of the moral law at all, such a 
being would lack the kind of personality and agency required to be held morally 
accountable for their actions and thus to be said to be evil.  We are left to assume that 
such a being would be incapable or sick or beyond normal human capacities.  
In addition, in other discussions of Kant's account and diabolical evil, 
commentators have pointed out that most evildoers, even the worst like Hitler, do not see 
their deeds as simply evil or evil for evil's sake, but see them as means toward some 
"good," however sick or incoherent this "good" may be.  Along these lines, we should 
acknowledge an important point about evildoers, rectitude, and self-deception, and how 
common it is for evildoers to state that what they are doing (or did in the past) is not 
unjustified and often serves some greater good.  We need only recall that even mass 
murderers like Hitler, Osama bin Laden, the Norwegian Anders Breivik, and many mass 
shooters seem to believe in their own rectitude in a twisted, sick way, usually motivated 
by extreme ideology.  
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Even with these reservations set out, we can still appreciate how Kant's account of 
evil allows him to reach areas he wouldn't have otherwise, furthering his moral theory 
into reaches largely unmatched before and since. By addressing radical evil, Kant 
develops his account of our moral psychology, the nature of free choice, the will, and the 
origins of evil deeds.  Most importantly, according to Ricoeur, Kant's account of radical 
evil reveals why morality takes the shape that it does, in the form of moral duties we must 
bind ourselves to and a moral law/ categorical imperative (against evil) we must follow if 
we are to avoid evil and the ever-present temptation to misuse our freedom.  As Ricoeur 
points out in one if his last books, Oneself as Another:  
 
"The second important idea is that, in radicalizing evil, in introducing the 
difficult idea of a bad maxim of all maxims, Kant also radicalized the very idea 
of (free) choice by the sole fact of having made it the seat of a real opposition at 
the very source of the formation of maxims. In this, evil reveals something about 
the ultimate nature of (free) choice. Human (free) choice appears to carry with it 
an original wound that affects its capacity for determining itself for or against the 
law; the enigma of the origin of evil is reflected in the enigma that affects the 
actual exercise of freedom. The fact that this penchant is always already present 
in every opportunity to choose but that it is at the same time a maxim of (free) 
choice is no less inscrutable than the origin of evil. 
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From the union of these two ideas there results the supposition that will 
henceforth govern the entire series of moments of the deontological conception 
of morality: does it not follow from evil and from the inscrutable constitution of 
(free) will that there is, consequently, a necessity for ethics to assume the features 
of morality? Because there is evil, the aim of the 'good life' has to be submitted to 
the test of moral obligation, which might be described in the following terms: 
"Act solely in accordance with the maxim by which you can wish at the same 
time that what ought not to be, namely evil, will indeed not exist."65 
 
Ricouer may very well be right that rejecting or avoiding evil may have played a major 
part in shaping the form of the categorical imperative, but here we can only stress that 
evil did indeed play a crucial role for Kant in filling out his views of morality, human 
freedom, and the will. 
 In sum, this discussion should show that among Kant's greatest insights remains 
his observation that evil represents the basically systematic inversion of the moral and 
non-moral, which we see this as the case in paradigm cases of evil actions and persons.  
From Kant's account we can better see that evil points to an underlying, central quality of 
an extreme form of wrongdoing.  To call something evil is therefore to be describing the 
moral quality or essence of the thing being judged; in other words, what is evil cannot be 
described accurately unless a reference to the evil lying at its core is understood. 
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 As the discussions by Arendt, Silber, Cooke, and others demonstrate, there is of 
course plenty of room for improving and building on Kant’s theory.  And in recent years, 
there has been a resurgence of interest in the subject of evil among philosophers.  Many 
of these accounts and  reflections begin with Kant’s account and the way he framed the 
problem.66  But above and beyond Kant’s substantive formulation of the problems and 
the solutions he offered, what should not be underappreciated is Kant’s willingness to 
confront evil in a serious manner, to draw on all the intellectual resources at his disposal 
to make sense of the problems that evil presented for his ethics, his critical philosophy, 
and for himself and the world we share.
                                                
66 I have in mind here, in particular, Richard Bernstein’s Radical Evil: A Philosophical 
Interrogation, Claudia Card’s The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,  2002) and Confronting Evils (cited above), and Susan Neiman’s Evil in Modern 
Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 2004).  Work by Kant scholars like Silber, 
Allison, Wood, Kuehn, and many others should obviously be seen as also developing Kant's 
account of radical evil. 
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GIVING EVIL ITS DUE: A RESURGENCE OF INTEREST IN EVIL IN RECENT 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
Recent discussions of the concept of radical evil (and more generally in dealing with 
moral evil) have often turned to Kant's account, finding much to criticize and to 
appreciate.  In common with Kant, for these recent philosophers evil is indeed something 
radical, but radical in a sense much different from the one Kant initially intended.  This is 
clear in the way Arendt returned attention to the idea of radical evil in her using the term 
to refer to the absolute evil of the death camps, an evil she claims Kant could not have 
fully comprehended under his notion of radical evil.  In the recent literature, there has 
formed a large consensus around referring to evil as the worst sort of wrongdoing, as 
beyond our normal categories of wrong, and so in this sense only a category for 
describing these sorts of absolute or horrific wrongs.  Kant, of course, included a much 
broader range of wrongs under the notion of radical evil, including many of the "ordinary 
evils" we are familiar with.  But for contemporary speakers, evil is primarily about those 
radical or extraordinary evils, the mass killings, genocides, systematic oppression, and 
other large-scale suffering inflicted by human beings for no good reason.  On these 
accounts, evil is a term reserved for the worst sorts of wrongs, things that cannot be 
described or judged under the usual categories of wrong and which exceed our moral 
comprehension, are unforgivable and unjustifiable, and retain a sort of inexplicability.  
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As Marcus Singer observes, evil is “the worst possible term of opprobrium imaginable,”67 
a term we reserve for the worst sorts of wrongs.  Finally, these wrongs are rightly called 
evil because at their root or center they are evil -- we cannot speak of them or judge them 
without reference to this inner evil nature or overriding character, their destructive and 
absolutely unjustifiable moral character.  In sum, what has emerged from these recent 
accounts is the viability of a conception of radical evil as what we now mean when we 
judge something to be evil. 
 Along with Richard Bernstein, the American philosopher Claudia Card has 
probably written in greatest detail and depth about evil in recent philosophy.  In two 
book-length treatments of evil and in a handful of articles, Card has articulated a complex 
and plausible definition of evil.  Card has worked to refine her account of evil in each of 
these works, settling on the definition of evil as "reasonably foreseeable intolerable harms 
produced by inexcusable wrongdoing.”68  While this is her own distinct definition, she 
acknowledges how it has been shaped by others currently writing and thinking about evil.  
Card explicitly acknowledges John Kekes along these lines.  Much like Card, Kekes 
defines evils as that which  “cause serious harm and lack excuse.”69    
 The largely semantic modification that I would make to the Card/Kekes definition 
is to offer an analysis of evil as a property or predicate rather than as a subject or event or 
noun.   Though this is strictly speaking a minor revision, one which I believe Card and 
Kekes would not oppose, it has important consequences for recognizing what makes an 
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agent, action, or state of affairs a case of radical evil.  In my view, Card prefers “evils” to  
“evil” because of her focus on the harms done, the consequences and suffering 
experienced rather than the “evil” of the perpetrator.  Card claims to focus on both, 
although at times she still seems to give much more weight to the serious harm caused 
rather than the wrongdoing which causes it or the motives and lack of excuses on the part 
of the perpetrators.  In the account offered here, I try to retain a steadier balance between 
the harm caused and the inexcusable wrongdoing which brings about the harm.  This is 
important for understanding radical evil as a moral concept to be employed in moral 
judgments, not a psychological description or explanation of an agent or state of affairs. 
 To return to the details of Card's account, both conditions, the intolerable harm 
condition and the inexcusability condition, must apply for an action to be evil.  Along 
with Card and others, I agree that for us today it is the intolerable harm caused (or 
intended) which first and foremost distinguishes evils.  We do not speak of an act or state 
of affairs being evil unless it brings about or intends to bring about serious and 
underserved harm (to human beings, animals, and perhaps to things like works of art or 
natural beauty).  As Card writes,“Evils have two irreducibly distinct components: a harm 
component and an agency component.  What distinguishes evils from less wrongs is the 
harm component. In contrast to less wrongs, evils do intolerable harm.  Ordinarily these 
harms, rather than the motives of the perpetrators, are what distinguish evils from lesser 
wrongs.”70 
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 Let us begin by looking at the intolerable harm condition of Card's account.  On 
Card’s definition, “intolerable harm deprives victims of basics ordinarily needed to make 
a life decent.  ‘Intolerable,’ here, is a normative concept.  It refers not to what individuals 
cannot in fact tolerate but to what a decent life cannot include.”71  It should not be hard to 
imagine the kinds of harms Card has in mind here without going into detail, the kinds of 
harms that make one question whether one’s life is worth living or is of value to oneself.  
A definition of these kinds of evils at least similar in spirit to Card’s is the theologian 
Marilyn McCord Adams’s definition of “horrendous evils.”  Adams defines horrendous 
evils as “evils the participation in which constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether 
the participant’s life could be a great good to him/her on the whole.”72 Adams’s concern 
with these sorts of horrendous evils, in addition to agreeing in an important respect with 
the definition of evil offered here, indicates the connection between the more 
secular/moral problem of evil focused on by Card, Kekes, and others, with the theological 
problem of evil.  In particular, this connection indicates that it is the wrongs which cause 
horrendous and intolerable harm that lie at the heart of the problem of evil (wrongs which 
may in fact cause the sorts of harm that we think God is inexcusable for allowing).  And 
as Neiman also observes in a similar vein, evils of a heinous, large-scale sort, such as the 
Lisbon earthquake or the death camps, can lead us to fundamentally question the 
intelligibility of the world and our understandings of it.  Thus, as Neiman observes, the 
problem of evil, raised by the sorts of large-scale, intolerable harms discussed here, 
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threatens us with a problem of whether we can make sense of a world with these kinds of 
evil, a problem which can lead to new waves of moral, secular, political, and theological 
reflections.73     
 One question worth exploring further, however, is whether Card is right to single 
out "intolerable" harm or suffering, which only human beings seem vulnerable to, as 
what distinguishes evil. We may think that some actions, including those which cause 
serious harm to animals, the environment, human works of art, etc. are also evil in the 
sense that they cause gratuitous destruction or harm. Perhaps then what distinguishes evil 
actions most is their gratuitous or useless nature, their causing harm for no reasonable or 
excusable purpose.  Gratuitous or useless suffering, as Levinas and Neiman each point 
out, presents us with serious doubts about the goodness or purposiveness of the world and 
may arouse efforts in theodicy in the hope of recovering certain moral and theological 
views of the world.  Nevertheless, Card's argument that the harms caused are what most 
distinguish evils in the majority of cases does serve as a very useful piece of guidance in 
helping us identify and understand evil. 
 Card's account of inexcusable wrongdoing, on the other hand, is related to the 
idea of gratuitousness and begins with the idea of possessing no reason or justification to 
excuse or diffuse one’s wrongdoing.  As Card writes, the evildoer has “no morally 
defensible reason….No good reasons mitigate their choices….That you can [cause 
serious] harm with impunity is not a good reason [to do so].  It is not that these reasons 
are insufficient.  The do not count morally in favor of the deed.  They carry no moral 
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weight.”74  Card describes two major classes of attempted excuses.  First, one might 
plead that one is not responsible for the harm caused (due to compulsion, ignorance, and 
the like).  Second, one might attempt to reduce the culpability of the wrong done by 
pointing to considerations which carry some moral weight even though they do not carry 
enough weight to make the deed morally permissible.  In cases of evildoing, neither of 
these excuses are present: one cannot appeal to one’s ignorance or compulsion, nor can 
one point to any moral considerations which were relevant to committing the harmful act.   
 Card rightly prefers the requirement of inexcusability over culpability, which may 
at first seem the more plausible condition of evildoing, but which is often very hard to 
establish firmly and is sometimes not of primary relevance to the evil in question.75 
Regarding culpability, sometimes there is no attempt whatsoever to justify the 
wrongdoing, for instance when it is done knowingly out of hatred, cruelty, to gain or 
maintain power over others, etc.  But in many other cases there are potentially mitigating 
factors that may seem to excuse the wrongdoer from being judged as evil.   However, the 
fact that there may be some possible explanation or even understandable, “rational” 
motives underlying the action in question does not make the evildoing justifiable or 
excusable in any way, Card argues.  Neither does it make the evildoing forgivable, or at 
least deserving of forgiveness. Forgiveness lies in the hands of the victims of evildoing, 
and in many if not all cases of radical evil, forgiveness of the deeds committed by the 
evildoer seems impossible because of the gravity of the harm suffered. Forgiveness may 
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always remain a possibility in principle, but in cases of radical evil it becomes hard to 
conceive of, evidenced by the fact that we do not really speak of forgiveness in cases of 
mass murder or atrocity.  
 While evil remains inexcusable and unforgivable, Card adds, there are cases 
where looking at what might have motivated the agent to act wrongly, we may 
occasionally change our assessment and no longer see the wrong as evil or judge the 
agent as culpable or perhaps even as seriously blameworthy.   But in most cases, looking 
at the possible motives and the circumstances of a situation will not alter our judgment 
that an agent has brought about serious harm through his own wrongdoing, wrongdoing 
which cannot be excused or justified by the apparently mitigating factors.  This is 
important, for it illustrates why it is valid and legitimate to judge ordinary people’s 
actions, for example, as evil.  Looking at ordinary evildoers, we are able to distinguish 
the actions of ordinary people along a range of degrees of evil and evildoers.  As Kekes 
observes,  “a morally inexcusable action may fall anywhere on a continuum from 
culpable ignorance or weakness to deliberately and knowingly doing evil for its own 
sake.”76  And while ordinary evildoers are in a much different place in the continuum 
than sadistic monsters, they nevertheless count as evildoers because of the harm they 
caused and because of the lack of any justification or excuse for their actions or inaction.  
In other words, because evil is something we always have decisive reason against doing, 
regardless of whether one is an “ordinary” evildoer or an “absolutely evil” monster, the 
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intolerable harms caused by such wrongdoing are inexcusable and therefore rightly 
judged as evil.  
 As Card, Kekes, and others also acknowledge, secular accounts of evil like the 
one offered here are at least partially inspired by theory of evil laid out by Kant in his 
account of “radical evil.”  On Kant’s view, evil is fundamentally a property of agents and 
their maxims, while for Card and others evil is not understood is more than just a matter 
of maxims or dispositions.  The accounts offered by Card and others in recent philosophy 
are a departure from Kant in many ways, but they nevertheless share in common with 
Kant the central argument that evil is never justifiable or excusable -- each of these 
philosophical accounts of evil remind us that there are decisive reasons to reject evil 
actions and this is what distinguishes evils from other wrongs.  On Kant’s view, the 
moral law always give us decisive reason to act in a certain way, to act according to duty, 
and therefore to perform evil deeds or deeds which are based on a maxim reversing the 
proper relationship of the moral and non-moral are in an important sense irrational – 
defective acts of rational moral agents.  Kant does not, however, deny that much of the 
evil that human beings perform is rationally motivated, or done according to some sort of 
(non-moral) reasons.  Therefore, drawing on Kant’s account, Card acknowledges that 
agents may have reasons for the wrongs they commit which cause serious harm, but these 
reasons in no sense provide them moral excuses or justifications for the actions they 
perform. 
 As Card rightly points out, there are many issues that can be raised about Kant's 
account, and there are necessary departures from Kant's account which a more adequate 
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contemporary account of evil might take.77  For instance, Kant’s “morally excluded 
middle,” in which agents and actions are seen as either good or evil with nothing in 
between, may go too far in clouding what exactly we are trying to pick out when we 
judge something to be evil.  Just as importantly, Kant’s account almost totally passes over 
the harm caused by evil actions in its exclusive focus on the evil of the agent’s maxim.  
Kant’s denial of diabolical evil is also somewhat puzzling and dissatisfying, as is the way 
many passages in his account (perhaps simply to accommodate to his largely Christian 
audience) suggest that evil is some sort of inexplicable force or disease akin to original 
sin or a Satanic force that cannot be defeated by human powers alone.  And yet, as Card, 
Bernstein, and other careful readers of Kant admit, it is quite striking how much Kant 
gets right and the room he created for developing an adequate account of moral evil. 
 The account offered by Card also offers a way of reconceiving the idea of 
diabolical evil or evil for evil’s sake, a familiar paradigm of evil but one that many 
following Kant argue is unintelligible or too medieval.  But on the account of evil 
defended by Card, diabolical evil refers to those evils done for the very purpose of 
causing the kind of radical evil that they bring about – unlike much evildoing, done for 
the sake of greed, ambition, envy, and other motives, diabolical evil is done purely for the 
sake of the evil that will be caused. These sorts of evildoing are performed (almost 
totally) in order to bring someone down or destroy or humiliate them, rather than in order 
to serve some more straightforward self-interested aim.  The discussion offered here 
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therefore opens up us a way of acknowledging that diabolical evil, or evil for evil’s sake, 
is possible, and while it is on a different level of wrongdoing than even many other kinds 
of evildoing, it is not the sort of thing that only devils can perform.78 
 
                                                
78 See Card’s discussion of diabolical evil in Confronting Evils, p. 57-61. 
71 
 
THE POLITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF EVIL 
 
The large-scale evils of the 20th century have driven those thinking about evil to focus on 
the social and political conditions of evildoing and how institutions and ideologies can 
have tremendous power in driving people to perform great evil.  As Card stresses in her 
account account, social, political, and economic institutions (and those who carry out its 
workings) can rightly be seen as evil.  Even at first glance, it is obvious that economic, 
social, and political institutions can and do cause large-scale, intolerable harm.   Such 
harms are usually against members of social groups or classes, through the wrongdoing 
and grave injustice of some set of arrangements, structures, or practices.  Examples from 
history and from the daily newspapers of institution-based evildoing are overwhelming in 
number and proportion.  What is at least a little more difficult to determine is exactly 
where the evils of the institution lie, which mechanisms or institutional practices cause 
these serious harms, and whether any individual or set of individuals is responsible or 
culpable.  Thus, institutional evil requires a more complex account of wrongdoing than 
non-institutional evil.   The most obvious puzzle is identifying who the set of responsible 
wrongdoers are: all citizens? just the planners, leaders, demagogues? the whole 
machinery of destruction or oppression?  We are thus led to closely examine institutions 
and those who participate in them, benefit from them, and support them, in order to pin-
point where the so-called action is that makes the institution or set of institutions evil 
(e.g. is it market society, the coercive state, class and gender inequalities, outright racist 
and antiegalitarian attitudes?).   
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 According to Card’s account of institutional evils, at least three kinds of things 
can be evil about an institution: the rules or norms which define or structure it; the way in 
which the rules are administered; and the unanticipated ways that rules and norms can 
work together to produce intolerable harms (often a result of piecemeal developments or 
changes for the worse).79 Often enough, however, regardless of whether we have an 
airtight case against the perpetrators of institutional evil, it is the large-scale harm that is 
caused by the institution or set of agents that is the thing we should apply the judgment 
concerning institutional evil against.  The harm caused is often no less obvious than the 
inexcusable nature of the harm.  Many cases of institutional evil appear simply senseless, 
totally without excuse, done with impunity by the perpetrators who have enough power to 
do what they wish and not fear any serious consequences, precisely because of their 
position in relation to the institutions and basic structure of society. Possible candidates 
for such kinds of institutional evil are organized state violence; the clearly exploitative 
and destructive components of capitalist economic structures and mechanisms; the 
various institutional forms of slavery; political and economic corruption at the cost of the 
vast majority of citizens’ well-being;  the injustices of the criminal justice system; the 
overall basic structure of society and how benefits and burdens are distributed unfairly or 
according to some deeply unjust arrangement; and the various forms of privilege and 
oppression that spring from unjust institutional arrangements that keep some in positions 
of power and others in inescapable positions of subservience and vulnerability.  Iris 
Young’s account of the five faces of oppression (exploitation, marginalization, 
                                                
79 Confronting Evils, p. 18 
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powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence) and the ways oppression is caused and 
mutually reinforced by various social institutions provides a good starting point for a 
more developed account of these kinds of institutional or structural evils.80 
 Card's account also attempts to bring attention to the importance of complicity in 
evil and to conceptualize why it so harmful (while not necessarily evil in itself).  
Complicity in evil is an admittedly vague and easy to misuse notion, the sort of notion 
that in making everyone guilty ends up making no one guilty.  An act of complicity with 
evil may not be evil itself, but it very often is a necessary condition for the kinds of 
evildoing, and especially the institutional or large-scale evildoing, that cause the most 
harm.  The motives which lead one to complicity with evil are usually quite ordinary and 
understandable, but acknowledging this does not mean that one is given an excuse to 
overlook or turn away as though one can simply wash one’s hands clean of someone 
else’s problem.   
 In an interesting discussion of the near total absence of resistance to the Nazi 
regime by German intellectuals like himself, Karl Jaspers looks to Kant to make sense of 
the complicity with evil fallen into by Germany's intellectual leadership.  The evil 
revealed in this moment of ethical decision points to "Not evil as deviltry ... but as the 
self-deceiving inversion of the conditional relationship between the will to happiness and 
moral claim: this was the basic appearance of the co-operation on the part of so many 
otherwise quite decent human beings. They wanted to be a part of it, justify it, because 
                                                
80 See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), chapter 2. 
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they received and increased their happiness, as they understood it, from participation in 
the regime, under the self-deceiving proviso of opposition in special cases. It was in this 
that I saw Kant’s radical evil and explained my own conduct."81 Jaspers here explains his 
failure to fully resist the evils of Nazi Germany as a paradigm example of Kantian radical 
evil. Jaspers was far from acting like the devilish being some of his countrymen clearly 
transformed into, but his actions nevertheless expose a fundamental moral weakness in 
his character, one which all too easily subordinated "moral claims" (i.e. to resist evil) to 
his own immediate happiness and self-interest (and avoid Nazi persecution).  
 Reflecting on the ways social and political factors can lead some to complicity 
with evil and others to perform evil deeds, we are led to the observation that most of the 
evil in the world today has its origins in social-political conflict.  Serial killers, child 
molesters, and psychopaths still exist, but the evil we have to fear most is that performed 
by political and institutional actors -- those with the means to cause widespread violence 
and suffering.  The forms of widespread political violence and oppression in our world 
should be confronted as the evil that they are.  While not as shocking to us as major 
atrocities, the suffering and misery of millions and millions of people due to oppressive 
and unjust social arrangements willingly sustained by global leaders is an evil radical in 
its depth and reach.  Similarly, we must also acknowledge evil’s external conditions, the 
ideologies and histories and feuds which lead to evils so unnecessary and inexcusable and 
senseless. If nothing else, the 20th century should have taught us this lesson concerning 
                                                
81 Karl Jaspers, "Reply," in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp 
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political evil, and as we continue to live a world in which the lives of millions can be 
erased by the orders of a single political figure, we must confront the realities and 
dangers of political evil, evil caused by political actors, enabled by political institutions 
and the scope of political life and the fact that a political leader or regime can suddenly 
come to possess overwhelming power over the lives of millions.82  This should not lead 
us to fear or turn away from these problems, but it should cause us to focus our 
philosophical and political efforts towards addressing the situation in which we live, in a 
world where power can all too easily be used for evil. 
The accounts offered by Card, Kekes, Neiman, and others capture much that is 
important about talking about evil.  They rightly attempt to return evil to an important 
place in our moral vocabularies and in response to the horrific wrongs in need of 
philosophical reflection.  However, they may nevertheless fail to capture important 
aspects of evil that Kant recognized before them when speaking about radical evil lying 
at the root and that those like Levinas have pointed to by speaking of the excesses and 
disruptiveness of evil.  In particular, Card and others do not address what is an equally 
important condition of evildoing which distinguishes it from other wrongs, that of the 
radical, or fundamental moral inversion that lies at the center of evil and which leads us 
to characterize something as evil.  This Kant rightly described as the underlying 
disposition of the will which serves as the ground of moral and immoral actions.  When 
speaking of "evil," it is to this underlying yet essential moral character that we are 
                                                
82 For a recent discussion of political evil and its role as the paradigm of contemporary evil, see 
Alan Wolfe, Political Evil (New York: Knopf, 2011). 
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pointing to when decrying evildoing.  We reserve the language of evil for those things 
that cannot be described in any other terms, where our normal categories of wrongdoing 
are inadequate, and where the more familiar motives of envy, rage, jealousy, greed, and 
so on do not fully explain what could have motivated someone to perform such serious 
wrongdoing.  We distinguish evil and degrees of evil according to the harm caused and 
by the motive of the perpetrator, reserving the harshest judgments for those deeds 
committed out of malice, hatred, racism, or sadism.  That is why we speak of evil as 
radical, as something corrupted at the fundamental moral level, in the essence or nature 
(at least morally speaking) of the thing in question.  For something to be rightly 
considered evil, this quality of violating the moral law lies at the very heart of that which 
we call evil.  In such horrific cases, no other term will capture our sense of moral horror, 
incredulity, and categorical rejection in response to  the wrong committed. 
With this brief overview of recent discussions of evil behind us, it is worth 
pausing for a moment to appreciate how durable the notion of radical evil has remained 
among philosophers working to make sense of evil.  First introduced by Kant, then given 
a key place in later works by Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard and others, the notion of 
radical evil has retained a significant status for many 20th century thinkers, including 
Jaspers, Arendt, Derrida, and in recent work on evil in philosophy.  Its basic intuition that 
evil is a concept which points to the inverted fundamental moral character of an action or 
agent has remained essential in intellectual discussions of evil and in everyday 
conversation.  The resilience of the notion of radical evil, which we've only begun to hint 
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at here, suggests the idea of radical evil best captures what we mean when we employ the 
notion of evil in our moral judgments today. 
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CONCLUSION: EVIL AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 
  
A final set of points needs to be addressed before concluding.  What we have claimed in 
this paper about the concept of evil has been at times rather broad and sweeping.  It may 
leave the impression that there is little left for us to worry about or be conflicted about 
when employing the notion of evil in our moral judgments.  Furthermore, it may leave 
the impression that with the account of evil defended here we can now speak with ease 
and with confidence about particular instances of radical evil in our world.  Nothing 
could be further from the truth.  Any plausible account of evil -- including the ones 
discussed in this paper -- to remain honest and not to be lying to itself, must admit that 
we cannot and perhaps never will be able to understand the particular evils that have been 
committed -- from the perspective of the perpetrators or that of the victims.  Historians 
and others writing about recent atrocities have gone to extraordinary lengths to get their 
hands on as many documents, diaries and letters, and have interviewed many survivors 
and many evildoers and participants in atrocity.  While claiming to have learned much 
about the events and evildoers in question, these chroniclers remain reluctant to say that 
they now understand or can explain the evil they have attempted to studying describe.  
Even less have they put forward an abstract conception or theory of evil that should offer 
an systematic explanation of the kind that no leaves no unsettling questions or intellectual 
discomfort.  Because evil is something radical, it will always allude our familiar 
intellectual categories and our moral frameworks -- these are what distinguish radical evil 
from other wrongs.  And because evils has this quality of exceeding or disrupting our 
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normal categories, any attempt to confine evil to a fixed and definite definition seems 
misguided at best. 
 Because there is no single essence to evil, no single entity or underlying drive that 
lies behind all evildoing, no social ill that lies at the root of all evil, evil will always 
exceed simple intellectual explanation.  Therefore, no category of "evil in general" can 
respond to and fully address a particular evil or evildoer in all its gory details.  The 
Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim draws attention to this point when he discusses the 
failure of all previous accounts of "evil in general" to face the Holocaust and the evils of 
Hitler and the Nazi perpetrators.  Fackenheim makes an important point in a letter to his 
former student Kenneth Hart Green:  "Now if you have to say—which is what I’m driven 
to say—that an unprecedented evil has occurred, then one cannot but immerse oneself in 
it, if one is to cope with it. You can’t ignore it, and you can’t classify it under 'evil-in-
general,' or even 'demonic-evil-in-general.' Then of course it’s not clear whether after 
you’ve emerged from that encounter, the world to which you get is the same."83 
As Fackenheim argues elsewhere, the accounts of radical evil offered by Kant and 
contemporary philosophers remain attempts at coming up with a timeless, universal, non-
temporal or historical account of evil in general.  Fackenheim finds much to appreciate in 
Kant's account of radical evil and frequently employs the notion of radical evil in 
referring to the Holocaust.  But like many others concerned with responding to the evil of 
the Holocaust, Fackenheim finds Kant's denial of diabolical evil to be out of touch with 
                                                
83 See the letter by Fackenheim to Kenneth Hart Green reprinted in "Leo Strauss, the ‘New 
Thinking,’ and To Mend the World," The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy Vol. 21, 
Issue 2, 2013 
80 
 
the reality of Nazi evil and sees other weaknesses that Kant's account shares with 
previous philosophical (and theological) accounts of evil, all of which are found wanting 
in light of the horrors of the Holocaust.  These accounts very likely fail to account for or 
adequately respond to the particular evils of the death camps and other horrors, in 
particular to the address what Fackenheim sees as Hitler's "near ultimate evil,"84 the 
unprecedented nature of the genocidal intentions of the Third Reich, and the degradation 
and total dehumanization which reigned in the death camps.  As Fackenheim argues 
against Leo Strauss, previous "high" or universal, abstract notions such as evil in general 
fail to explain the "low," particular evils of the Nazi genocide, making a post-Holocaust 
philosophy and account of radical evil absolutely necessary.85  
Bearing witness to the gravity of the evil of the Holocaust, in his two-volume 
work Nazi Germany and the Jews, the historian Saul Friedlander attempts to write a 
thorough narrative history of the Holocaust without eliminating or domesticating our 
sense of disbelief.86  Friedlander's book stands as perhaps the greatest historical 
reconstruction of the Holocaust we have, unsurpassable perhaps in its scope and 
knowledge of original documents, witness testimonies, and work by other historians, but 
Friedlander insists that there remains much that he cannot make sense of, that refuses to 
                                                
84 For Fackenheim's remarks about Hitler's "near ultimate evil," and attempts by other 
philosophers, historians, and writers to figure out what could have possibly driven Hitler to wage 
a genocidal war against the Jews, see Ron Rosenbaum's book Explaining Hitler: The Search for 
the Origins of His Evil (Random House: New York, 1998).  
85 For Fackenheim's discussions of each of these issues, see Fackenheim's far-reaching work in 
post-Holocaust thought, To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought 
(Schocken: New York, 1982). 
86 See Saul Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution (Harper Collins: 
New York, 1997) and Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Extermination (Harper Collins: 
New York, 2007). 
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be brought under our powers of historical understanding. Following Friedlander, perhaps 
any sincere, viable account of evil should also admit that there will always remain much 
about evil that we cannot explain or reduce to terms we can deal with. 
In Friedlander's work and in the memoirs of Holocaust survivors like Primo Levi 
and Elie Wiesel, no abstract accounts of evil are offered. Instead we find first-person 
accounts of radical, extreme evil, images (and narratives) of evil which to a great degree 
have come to represent for later generations the evils of the Nazi atrocities: e.g. for Levi, 
the image of the Muselmanner, for Wiesel the child hanging in the gallows.87  As Levi 
writes of the Muselmanner, "Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the 
Muselmanner, the drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, 
continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, 
the divine spark dead within them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to 
call them living: one hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which they have no 
fear, as they are too tired to understand.  They crowd my memory with their faceless 
presences, and if I could enclose all the evil of our time in our image, I would choose this 
image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head dropped and shoulders 
curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of a thought is to be seen."88 
As painful as it is to admit, we can only assume that new forms of evil will catch 
us off guard and bring in more waves of destruction, much like evil erupted in the 20th 
century and uprooted a whole continent.  No perpetrator, no matter how monstrous and 
                                                
87 See Elie Wiesel, Night, Transl. Marion Wiesel (Hill and Wang: New York, 2006). 
88 Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, Trans. Stuart Woolf (Simon and Schuster: New York, 
1996), p. 60 
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full of self-knowledge, could ever explain to us all that went into the evils committed and 
settle once and for all what evil is. To understand evil and the evildoing around us thus 
needs to be a constant preoccupation of those seeking to understand the human condition.  
Acknowledging these limitations on our abilities to confront evil should not lead us to 
mystify evil or to romanticize it or make it larger than life.  To recognize that evil alludes 
total comprehension is to confront evil for what it is, something that when we are honest 
with ourselves we must painfully admit is to some extent beyond our power to 
understand, to forgive, and to prevent via human institutions. Survivors like Levi, who 
more than Wiesel does try to theorize some aspects of life in the camps and the 
perpetrators motives and psyche, nevertheless acknowledges that this is the attitude in 
which we must confront evil, as something which will never be fully understood.  As 
Fackenheim, Amery, Levi, and others remind us, evil is always something concrete and 
real in causing horrendous, useless suffering.  It cannot be reduced from its concrete 
nature to something abstract or easily explicable or excusable that we can then subsume 
into our broader intellectual frameworks -- that is why evil is a continuing challenge. 
This is just one crucial lesson which academic philosophy could learn by listening 
to these unfamiliar voices. While philosophy, by its very nature, will very likely continue 
to cherish the search for knowledge and for theories with the status of deep, sweeping 
explanatory power and clarity, philosophy may also be able to recognize its own powers 
to contribute to our understanding in these areas which matter as much to us as human 
beings as any problem of mind, language, or metaphysics.  It may also find that, as 
Fackenheim puts it, "thought going to school with life," is extremely important for 
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philosophy to have any grasp on the human condition which has always been its major 
preoccupation.89  Philosophy may even find that it may be well positioned to deal with 
the problem of evil, a problem many may think is not worthy of more philosophical 
debate but which remains a perennial and fundamental problem for philosophy -- for 
those doing working in metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, 
and the history of philosophy 
Even more, philosophers (along with everyone else) should not underestimate the 
power we have to prevent certain evils and address the kinds of conditions and 
motivations that commonly give rise to evildoing.  We have only to imagine what may 
have been different if the intellectual, theological, and political leadership of a highly 
educated and civilized society had been better prepared to deal with a radical evil that 
grew and somehow seized power.  Confronting evil is unfortunately a task that will 
continue to preoccupy us as long as human beings retain some freedom to act, a freedom 
which involves the ready possibility of seriously harming other human beings.  Despite 
the challenges that evil continues to bring against us, those who take responsibility for 
addressing evil must remain vigilant, must refuse to be duped by evil or its deniers, and 
must keep asking questions even as we continue to struggle to find answers. 
                                                
89 For a discussion of what "thought going to school with life" might mean for post-Holocaust 
thought,, see Fackenheim, To Mend the World. 
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AFTERWORD: WHAT'S SO RADICAL ABOUT EVIL -- ARENDT, THE 
EICHMANN TRIAL, AND THE NATURE OF EVIL 
 
Talking about evil in terms of banality and ordinary evildoers runs the risk of masking 
many of the other ways evil should rightly be described -- often as much more than 
something banal.  As Kuehn rightly argues, "Evil is a moral category and it applies to 
horrific acts that are by that very fact not banal."90  Perhaps some, even most, evildoers 
are motivated by the kinds of ordinary, prosaic motives Arendt ascribes to Eichmann.  
But as Kuehn notes, noticing the banality of some evil is only zeroing in on one angle of 
the evildoing in question -- some evildoers are indeed banal, thoughtless, etc., like 
Arendt's Eichmann, but just as many evildoers are anything but banal, and neither is the 
horrific suffering that they inflict.  Even the most banal evildoers, supposed desk 
murderers like Eichmann, knowingly bring about suffering and death that is horrendous 
for its victims. While Arendt seemed to have not been much disturbed by Eichmann's 
"thoughtlessness," there is something extremely frightening about Arendt's Eichmann, a 
man whose lack of apparent spiritual conflict or guilt while sending millions of men, 
women, and children to their death.  Despite falling short of a devilish being, Eichmann is 
certainly not someone we should see as ordinary, as though anyone would have 
performed his deeds with bureaucratic zeal day after day delighting in the numbers of 
innocent he'd delivered to their deaths as though he was just delivering goods to be 
distributed. 
                                                
90 "How Banal is Evil?," p. 145 
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Furthermore, as Arendt herself openly confesses, "the banality of evil" is not 
meant to be a theory of evil, as though evil could be fully described under the notion of 
banality. Jennifer Geddes stresses this feature of Arendt's book on Eichmann: "Arendt’s 
thesis points to an understanding of evil as particular, evolving, and nonessentialist. In 
fact, that she arrived at her thesis about evil by attending an historical event and focusing 
on a particular perpetrator suggests that Arendt herself resisted essentialist 
understandings of evil. Her method reveals the importance of attending to the particular 
and of continually attending to the possibility of new forms of evil."91  What popped out 
to Arendt at Eichmann's trial was that he was not the monster or diabolical villain that 
many had expected, a discovery that led her to her thoughts about the apparent banality of 
his motives (and the gap between the horror of his crimes and the bland personality of 
Eichmann).  Eichmann therefore seemed to represent a new kind of perpetrator, perhaps a 
paradigm of many of those who brought about the Nazi genocide -- a new crime with a 
distinctive kind of perpetrator and which confronts us with a particular form of evil.   
But the banal aspects of Eichmann and his motives are much different from the 
radical evil designed to reign in the death camps and the sadism and torture that lie at the 
heart of the Nazi system of domination.  As Arendt well realized and wrote about at 
length in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the death camps brought into existence by the 
Nazi leadership was motivated by much more than banal motives -- in fact, on Arendt's 
account, one she never changed throughout several new editions of the book, there 
                                                
91 Jennifer L. Geddes, "Banal Evil and Useless Knowledge: Hannah Arendt and Charlotte Delbo 
on Evil after the Holocaust," Hypatia, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 2003), p. 109 
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remains something radical, absolutely evil and even demonic about the camps and the 
total domination and torture that lie at the heart of the Nazi regime and its imagination.  
As Bernstein concludes in his perceptive discussion of Arendt, "Arendt never repudiated 
the thought-trains that went into her original discussion of radical evil, especially the 
claim that radical evil involves making human beings as human beings superfluous, as 
well as systematic attempt to eliminate human spontaneity, individuality, and plurality. 
On the contrary, the phenomenon that she identified as the banality of evil presupposes 
this understanding of radical evil."92 In other words, while Eichmann may have appeared 
a rather ordinary, banal man, certainly nothing resembling Satanic greatness, the deeds he 
willingly performed had the distinctive, radical aim of exterminating a whole people.  
Later historical work has shown that Eichmann seemed to delight in the act of playing 
God and acting as The Lord of Death in overseeing the deportation of European Jews to 
the death camps, something he reportedly bragged about until the end of his life.  There 
should not be, then, any forgetting the radical evil that Eichmann knowingly carried out 
in a rather spirited and determined manner.93 
The greatest flaw in Arendt's account, however, is that by referring to Eichmann 
as banal and merely thoughtless, Arendt's account tends to slip into a hopeful mode much 
like a theodicy, reducing evil to something more easily domesticated to our broader views 
(or in Arendt's case, her conflicted identification with German culture, philosophy, and 
                                                
92 Bernstein, Radical Evil, p. 218 
93 For more evidence of a less banal Eichmann, see the important recent biography by David 
Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann (Da Capo: Cambridge, MA, 2004) and also the recent book by 
Deborah Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial (Schocken: New York, 2011). 
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her mentor Martin Heidegger) and therefore presenting no serious problem for us.  In 
common with many other attempts at theodicy, Arendt is forced to distort and 
underestimate the reality of evil in order to make it fit into her broader aim in reconciling 
evil with the rest of her views.  On Arendt's account, Eichmann comes to represent the 
largely banal and non-monstrous nature of contemporary evildoers, whose main flaw is 
being "thoughtless" rather than sadistic, malevolent, or diabolical.  This reduces evil to 
something which we can perhaps grasp intellectually and maybe even defeat politically 
and morally.  As Susan Neiman probably first noticed, Arendt's Eichmann book therefore 
stands as a kind of secular theodicy, an explaining away of the problem of Nazi evil that 
had disturbed Arendt for so long.94  That is why, as Arendt admitted in a letter to her 
close friend Mary McCarthy, she wrote her report on the Eichmann trial in a "curious 
state of euphoria" and felt a huge weight be lifted off her shoulders by going to the trial in 
Jerusalem and confronting a representative of Nazi evil in the flesh, before then 
collecting her thoughts and writing the reports for The New Yorker.95 
It is telling that Arendt would draw these specific conclusions rather than others 
from the Eichmann trial, a trial which also served as an unprecedented venue for 
testimony by victims of the horrors of the Holocaust.  Arendt briefly mentions these first-
hand accounts of the horrific suffering brought about by the system Eichmann and other 
Germans maintained, but complains that such testimony had little to due with the guilt or 
                                                
94 See Neiman, "Theodicy in Jerusalem," in Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, Edited by Steven E. 
Ascheim (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001). 
95 Letter by Arendt to Mary McCarthy, included in a collection of their correspondence, Between 
Friends, edited by Carol Brightman (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), p. 168 
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innocence of the man on trial.  Arendt may have been right from a juridical point of view, 
and yet making this judgment about what is appropriate for a legal proceeding does not 
seem like a good reason to basically ignore all the survivor testimonies which spoke to a 
very much non-banal evil and then claim that what one came away with at the trial was 
the undeniable lesson about the banality of evil.  In a well-known rebuff to Arendt, Jean 
Amery writes, "For there is no ‘banality of evil,’ and Hannah Arendt, who wrote about it 
in her Eichmann book, knew the enemy of humankind only from hearsay, saw him only 
through the glass cage. When an event places the most extreme demands on us, one ought 
not to speak of banality.”96  Amery, in his wrenching account of the torture he 
experienced at the hands of the SS, demonstrates beyond any doubt that there was 
nothing banal about the torture he suffered at the hands of Nazi henchmen.  It is 
unfortunate that Arendt chose to largely leave out the testimonies given during the trial of 
survivors like Amery who left no doubt that the evils of the Nazis were anything but 
banal. Perhaps if her book had better reflected what took place at the trial in Jerusalem, a 
much different account of evil would have emerged. 
 
                                                
96 Jean Amery, At the Mind's Limits (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 25 
89 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, Marilyn McCord.  Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell: Cornell 
University Press, 2000) 
 
Amery, Jean.  At the Mind's Limits (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980) 
 
Arendt, Hannah.  Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking, 1963)  
 
_____.  “Nightmare and Flight,” reprinted in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954. Ed. 
Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, 1994) 
 
_____.  The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1994) 
 
Arendt, Hannah, Mary McCarthy, and Carol Brightman. Between Friends: the 
Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 1949-1975 (Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 1995) 
 
Bauer, Yehuda. The Holocaust in Historical Perspective (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1982) 
 
Bernstein, Richard.  “Did Hannah Arendt Change Her Mind? From Radical Evil to the 
Banality of Evil,” in Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later. Eds. Larry May and Jerome 
Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 
 
_____.  Radical Evil: a Philosophical Interrogation (Polity: Cambridge, MA, 2002) 
 
_____.  "Evil and Theodicy," in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Edited by Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004) 
 
_____.  "The Abuse of Evil," in Deliver Us From Evil, Edited by M. David Eckel and 
Bradley L. Herling (Continuum: New York, 2008 
 
Cesarani, David.  Becoming Eichmann (Da Capo: Cambridge, MA, 2004) 
 
Browning, Christopher. Ordinary Men (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) 
 
Card, Claudia.  The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,  2002)    
 
_____.  Confronting Evils (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
 
Confino, Alon.  "Why did the Nazis Burn the Hebrew Bible," The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 84, No. 2, p. 369-400 
90 
 
 
Cooke, Maeve.  "An Evil Heart: Moral Evil and Moral Identity," in Rethinking Evil: 
Contemporary Perspectives, Edited by Maria Pia Lara (University of California Press: 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001) 
 
Dawes, James.  "Understanding Evil," The Chronicle of Higher Education," July 1, 2013 
 
Fackenheim, Emil.  To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought 
(Schocken: New York, 1982) 
 
Ferrara, Alessandro.  "The Evil that Men Do," in Rethinking Evil 
 
Friedlander, Saul.  Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution (Harper 
Collins: New York, 1997) 
 
_____.  Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Extermination (Harper Collins: New 
York, 2007) 
 
Geddes, Jennifer L.  "Banal Evil and Useless Knowledge: Hannah Arendt and Charlotte 
Delbo on Evil after the Holocaust," Hypatia, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 2003) 
 
Green, Kenneth Hart.  "Leo Strauss, the ‘New Thinking,’ and To Mend the World," The 
Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2013 
 
Herman, Barbara. The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993) 
 
Jaspers, Karl.  "Reply," in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp 
(Tudor Publishing Company: New York, 1957) 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Edited by Theodore M. 
Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (Harper: New York: 1960) 
 
Kekes, John.  The Roots of Evil, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2005) 
 
Kuehn, "How Banal is Evil?," in Deliver Us From Evil 
 
Lang, Berel.  Post-Holocaust: Interpretation, Misinterpretation, and the Claims of History 
(Indiana University Press: Bloomington, Indiana, 2005) 
 
Levi, Primo.  Survival in Auschwitz, Trans. Stuart Woolf (Simon and Schuster: New 
York, 1996) 
 
91 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel.  Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969) 
 
_____.  "Transcendence and Evil," in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 
 
_____.  "Useless Suffering," in Entre Nous (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1998) 
_____.  The Provocation of Levinas, Edited by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood 
(New York and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988) 
 
 
Michalson, Gordon.  Fallen Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
 
Neiman, Susan.  "Theodicy in Jerusalem," in Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, Edited by 
Steven E. Ascheim (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001) 
 
_____.  "What's the Problem of Evil?," in Rethinking Evil 
 
_____.  Evil in Modern Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 2004) 
 
Oxford English Dictionary, OED Online. June 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/65386?rskey=gR6VvS&result=3 (accessed June 11, 
2014) 
 
Ricoeur, Paul.  The Symbolism of Evil (Beacon Press: Boston, 1967) 
 
_____.  "Evil: A Problem for Philosophy and Theology," Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, Vol. 53, No. 4, p. 635-648 
 
_____.  Oneself as Another, Translated by Kathleen Blarney (University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago, 1992) 
 
Rosenbaum, Ron.  Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil (Random 
House: New York, 1998) 
 
Russell, Jeffrey Burton.  The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive 
Christianity (Ithaca: Cornell, 1977) 
 
_____.  Satan: The Early Christian Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell, 1981)  
 
_____.  Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, Cornell, 1984) 
 
_____.  Mephistopheles: the Devil in the Modern World (Ithaca, Cornell, 1986) 
92 
Silber, John R.  "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," in Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone, Edited by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson 
_____.  "Kant at Auschwitz." Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress 
(1991). 
Singer, Marcus.  “The Concept of Evil,” Philosophy 79 (2004), p. 185-214 
Wiesel, Elie.  Night, Transl. Marion Wiesel (Hill and Wang: New York, 2006) 
Wolfe, Alan.  Political Evil (New York: Knopf, 2011) 
Wood, Allen.  "The Intelligibility of Evil," in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil. Eds. Sharon 
Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
Young, Iris Marion.  Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990) 
